A planned massacre? British intelligence analysis and the German army at the Battle of Broodseinde, 4 October 1917 by Freeman, John
    
 
 
 
School of History and Cultures 
 
 
 
A Planned Massacre? British Intelligence Analysis and the 
German Army at the Battle of Broodseinde,  
4 October 1917 
 
By 
 
 
John Freeman 
 
 
 
Thesis submitted to 
The University of Birmingham 
   In partial fulfilment for the degree of M Phil in Twentieth-Century 
British History 
School of History and Cultures 
July 2011 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
University of Birmingham Research Archive 
 
e-theses repository 
 
 
This unpublished thesis/dissertation is copyright of the author and/or third 
parties. The intellectual property rights of the author or third parties in respect 
of this work are as defined by The Copyright Designs and Patents Act 1988 or 
as modified by any successor legislation.   
 
Any use made of information contained in this thesis/dissertation must be in 
accordance with that legislation and must be properly acknowledged.  Further 
distribution or reproduction in any format is prohibited without the permission 
of the copyright holder.  
 
 
 
 
 
Contents 
 
Acknowledgements         
 
Introduction         p. 1 
 
 
Chapter I. The Build-Up to the Battle of Broodseinde, 4 October 1917. p. 6 
 
 Introduction        p. 7 
 
The War Office       p. 8 
 
GHQ         p. 14 
 
The Armies        p. 20 
 
The Corps        p. 26 
 
The Divisions        p. 31 
 
The Intelligence Corps       p. 35 
 
Conclusion         p. 41 
 
 
Chapter II. Broodseinde: the Day by Day Intelligence Picture.  p. 43 
 
Introduction        p. 44 
 
28 September 1917       p. 45 
 
29 September 1917       p. 49 
 
30 September 1917       p. 52 
 
1 October 1917       p. 57 
 
2 October 1917       p. 62 
 
3 October 1917       p. 67 
 
Conclusion         p. 71 
 
Bibliography         p. 74 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Acknowledgements 
 
 
This study would not have been possible without the help of Gary Sheffield, Michael 
LoCicero and John Bourne. My thanks also go to Fred Judge and Jack Sheldon for their 
contributions and especially to Helen, for her patience, understanding and support. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
 
Introduction 
 
 
In the early hours of 4 October, 4
th
 Guards Infantry Division had completed all the 
necessary preparations for an attack to recapture the parts of the position near Zonnebeke 
which had been previously lost. They were already gathered in great masses and backed by 
reserves. Their batteries...opened up heavy fire, only to be hit by a deluge of counter-
fire...Simultaneously the enemy brought down drum fire on a fifteen kilometre front...The 
4
th
 Guards was smashed before it ever got started.
1
 
 
The German 4
th
 Guards Division suffered horrific losses on this day.
2
 Further up the line 
other German divisions had also been waiting to go over the top at the Broodseinde Ridge. 
The 19
th
 Reserve Division had been lying in their positions in the trenches when the British 
bombardment of the 5
th
 Division broke them up just as comprehensively.
3
 The entire 45
th
 
Reserve Division was also caught in the open along with regiments from the 4
th
 Bavarian 
Division. The casualty figures for this one day were appalling. The 45
th
 Reserve Division lost 
83 officers and 2800 other ranks, whilst the 4
th
 Guards Division suffered 86 officers and 2700 
other ranks killed.
4
 This German attack, codenamed Operation Hohensturm, had been 
planned to start at 6am. The reason for this slaughter was that at the same time, twelve British 
divisions were in their lines ready to commence their attack also. The British artillery opened 
fire at 5.25am across the front, with four divisions immediately following the creeping 
barrage. The rest would come half an hour later.
5
 The two opposing attacks were separated by 
just half an hour. One German officer wrote, „what actually happened in that swampy area in 
the dark and the fog, no pen of a living author can ever write‟.6 The Battle of Broodseinde, 
fought during the campaign of the Third Battle of Ypres, was nothing less than a massacre.  
 
The aim of this study is to examine what the British Expeditionary Force [BEF] knew in 
advance about this failed German attack. The Battle of Broodseinde has been well chronicled 
because of these exceptional events. It was an important operation during the Third Battle of 
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Ypres (31 July- 10 November 1917). Administered by Second Army of the BEF under 
General Sir Herbert Plumer, it was his third operation and the fifth battle of the campaign. Its 
objective was to recapture key ground in the form of the Broodseinde Ridge from which the 
battle took its name. This would deny the German Army a commanding view of the 
battlefield and also neutralise a key artillery position. 
 
The Battle of Broodseinde was partly chosen because of the events that occurred. Another 
factor was that 1917, and particularly the Third Battle of Ypres, saw the BEF move from 
being a junior partner of the Entente to assuming the lead role on the western front. It was 
also chosen because the date of the attack was brought forward by the commanders of the 
BEF from 6 October 1917 to 4 October.
7
 The reasoning for this was to continue the 
operational tempo to ensure success. This thesis will examine whether this might have been 
influenced by military intelligence. This was the information received and analysed by the 
formations prosecuting the attack. If intelligence did play a part in this decision, then that 
could imply that the BEF either planned to massacre the German soldiers or had adopted an 
extremely aggressive and opportunistic policy. By focussing on the level where operations 
were being directed, this thesis has to target intelligence that was of purely military value.  
 
In order to accurately examine intelligence analysis in the build up to the Battle of 
Broodseinde, this study first needs to set the context into which it fell. This shall be done by 
splitting the study into two halves. The first half, Chapter I, will explain this background so 
that a solid basis can be made from which to assess intelligence analysis. There will be two 
objectives to this first chapter. The first will be to provide an explanation of the battle and its 
place in the First World War. This will include examining the strategy, operational planning, 
the conduct of the war up to that point and relevant historical debates. The second is to 
provide an examination of how military intelligence was operating before the battle. To 
ensure clarity, this chapter will be structured based on the levels of command of the BEF 
during this period.  The second half of the thesis, or Chapter II, shall assess the intelligence 
picture in the immediate build up to Broodseinde. As the formations of the BEF wrote daily 
intelligence reports, this half of the thesis shall bring together these reports to build up a day 
by day picture of what these organisations knew about their enemy. In adopting this structure, 
                                                          
7
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3 
 
this study shows influences from certain components of the First World War‟s 
historiography.
8
 The reason for this is that by adopting a two part structure it can first 
establish a context then describe the intelligence picture before the battle. By adhering to this 
format this study can clearly detail what was known to whom and when. Although detailing 
seven days may be seen as limiting, it is necessary for reasons of space. However, it does 
help to confirm the theory that the BEF‟s intelligence system relied on the accumulation of 
information over time.
9
 The first part of the thesis combats this shortcoming by examining 
the intelligence that each level of command was analysing two months before the battle. 
Further rationales for both the time period chosen and the problems that some of the archival 
sources have produced will be given where appropriate. 
 
 
To set the battle in context would not be possible without recourse to the wide historiography 
of the First World War.
10
 The past twenty years has seen a renaissance in scholarly debate in 
this area. It has given us a greater understanding of British strategy,
11
 how the military 
operations were conducted and directed,
12
 and the tactics employed in them.
13
 The Third 
Battle of Ypres is also well debated as it was a major campaign of the conflict.
14
 Conversely, 
the historiography of military intelligence during this period is far younger. One of the first 
scholars to incorporate the influence of intelligence to the wider conflict was John Terraine, 
but his study was compromised by a lack of official records being made public.
15 
This 
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continued to be an issue for other historians
16
 with the result of an unhealthy reliance on 
private papers and diaries.
17
 Only in the last twenty years has the requisite material been 
made public. As a result a breadth of new studies has been written. Some have been limited 
in their focus,
18
 whereas others have cherry picked information leaving no context.
19
 Others 
examine the development of intelligence over a wider period and as such do not dwell 
exclusively on the First World War.
20
 Although they are exciting developments in the 
historiography, the official histories of MI5 and MI6, or the Security Service and Secret 
Intelligence Service respectively, are further examples of studies with a wider remit.
21
 
Michael Occleshaw‟s Armour Against Fate is the only published work that attempts to 
correct this. Although it provides balanced analysis in certain areas of historical debate, it 
suffers from a meandering narrative and a reliance on uncorroborated material, thus 
underlining a poor methodology.
22
 However, one unpublished thesis does succeed in 
providing a clear examination of military intelligence during the First World War. Jim 
Beach‟s unpublished thesis, „British Intelligence and the German Army 1914-1918‟ can be 
seen to be a definitive study in military intelligence during the First World War, although 
again its remit covers the entire period of 1914-1918.
23
 The intelligence historiography may 
be young and only now has begun to mature, but nevertheless it has provided a solid basis for 
this study.  
 
This historiography has only been able to build up due to the recent availability of archival 
sources. The National Archives, formerly the Public Records Office, [TNA: PRO] in Kew 
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holds all that has survived of the documentation that the BEF produced during the First 
World War.
24
 Likewise the Australian War Memorial [AWM] holds a similar collection for 
the Australian Imperial Force [AIF], which was utilised at Broodseinde.
25
  These collections 
include the daily, weekly and fortnightly intelligence summaries of the BEF‟s formations. 26 
These sources present some problems due to being incomplete or copied across collections. 
Specific gaps will be notified when relevant. Other archival sources come in the form of 
private collections of papers and diaries.
27
 These provide added context to the often dry 
reporting of the intelligence summaries. However, they cannot always provide much relevant 
detail in regards to illuminating the daily build up of field intelligence. As they also mainly 
come from officers in high positions, they are broader in their focus. As such this thesis has 
utilised the intelligence summaries to build up the intelligence picture as their focus is purely 
military. It has used the other archival sources to provide context and background to the battle 
and intelligence system.  
 
This thesis does not set out to gauge the accuracy of British military intelligence at 
Broodseinde, but to assess what was known of the German counter-attack and when. As 
Beach states „regardless of whether, in hindsight, British intelligence officers were correct 
about the German Army, it is their perception and its degree of influence that is important to 
a full understanding of British military conduct during the First World War‟.28 What is being 
measured in this thesis is not the accuracy of the intelligence but rather, how accurately it was 
being analysed. Intelligence analysis was a distinct discipline, one that required its own 
methodology. It was seen as „academic‟ by British officers in a pejorative sense.29 However, 
as this study shall show, intelligence analysis was, by 1917, a fully developed and important 
aspect to the BEF‟s continued prosecution of the war. 
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Chapter I:  
The Build-Up to the Battle of Broodseinde,  
4 October 1917. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7 
 
Introduction 
 
This first chapter of the thesis shall provide the context for both the Battle of Broodseinde 
and military intelligence during the years and months leading up to it. It will consider the 
relationship of military intelligence at each step of its command structure down to division 
level, as this was the lowest level where analysis occurred.
1
 No intelligence summaries were 
written from Brigade level down.
2
  As such this part of the thesis will look at the different 
organisations that were concerned with intelligence analysis. Starting at the top of the chain 
of command, these levels were: the War Office in London [WO]; General Headquarters in 
France [GHQ]; the Armies; the Corps and the Divisions. For all of these organisations it will 
assess their structure and strengths and weaknesses of its intelligence analysis in the build up 
to the Battle of Broodseinde. It will then conclude its findings. 
 
 
                                                          
1
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The War Office  
 
The WO was responsible for the direction of the British war effort.  Based in London, it 
directed the strategy of British forces in all theatres of the war, as well as its operations, 
administration and intelligence gathering. Through the course of the war it had already 
undergone many changes and expansions to ensure the army‟s superiority and effectiveness 
as the effects of total war were felt. The mass expansion of the British Army was felt by the 
WO. At its peak in 1917, the British Army employed 3.9 million men, 1.7 million of these on 
the western front. This number was not matched exponentially by the number of staff 
officers, which consistently hovered at around 12,000.
1
 This resulted in poor management of 
the British Army for much of the war. This was compounded by its traditional class based 
hierarchy. Structural and organisational changes in late 1916, although achieving much good 
for the intelligence services in particular, led to an increasing bureaucracy in the WO. 
Although steps were taken to combat this, particularly by Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig 
and GHQ, mostly the system of command of the army remained one of „top-down line 
management‟.2 The WO was not, however, ineffective. Its re-organisation and restructuring 
allowed a successful prosecution of military intelligence in the later years of the war. 
 
 In 1914 the intelligence branch of the WO came under the jurisdiction of the Directorate of 
Military Operations [DMO]. Lieutenant-General Sir George Macdonogh headed this 
department.
3
 Working conditions at this time were difficult. Field-Marshal Sir John French, 
commanding the BEF, believed that the WO departments were suitable only for intelligence 
regarding the German Army on the western front.
4
 As a result of poor sources and internal 
pressure from his intelligence commanders to fulfil wider remits than just the German Army, 
and with GHQ gaining greater independence in this respect, competition between these 
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organisations grew.
5
  After the defeats of 1914-15 Sir John French was replaced as 
Commander of the BEF by Sir Douglas Haig. The head of the British Army, the Chief of the 
Imperial General Staff [CIGS], Sir Archibald Murray, was replaced by Sir William Robertson 
on 23 December 1915.
6
 Both Robertson and Haig, now Generals, wanted to move away from 
a civilian dictated strategy by the War Cabinet and put into motion an extensive reform of the 
General Staff.
7
 At this point jurisdiction of secret intelligence fell to Military Operations 
[MO]. The reforms created two directorates of equal importance: Military Operations [MO] 
and Military Intelligence [MI] to combat the extensive growth of the intelligence staff.
8
 
Macdonogh was given the newly created role of Director of Military Intelligence [DMI], now 
free of MO oversight and answerable only to the CIGS himself.
9
 From here each office was 
further re-organised. These structural reforms substantially helped military intelligence to 
grow in importance although failed to create a singular chain of command between the WO 
and GHQ. 
 
MI was structured into nine sub-sections by 1917.
10
 Two offices administered foreign 
espionage: MI3 under Brevet-Lieutenant Colonel E.W. Cox, who oversaw analysis for all of 
Europe, including all German military information; and MI1 under Brevet-Lieutenant 
Colonel C.N. French, who were responsible for the accumulation of intelligence directly 
relating to the German armies globally. MI1 itself was further sub-divided into departments, 
as were all MI offices. The most discussed sub-section of MI1 by historians is MI1(c), which 
oversaw „Special Duties – Secret Intelligence‟. It was headed by Captain Mansfield Smith 
Cumming RN or „C‟. This was the precursor to both the modern MI6 or „Secret Intelligence 
Service‟ and MI5 or „Security Service‟.11 The title, however, was merely a formality and 
Cumming operated his office with a certain degree of autonomy. Such was this independence 
that, in November 1915, before the staff reforms, Cumming argued that his bureau was being 
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side-tracked amongst the many offices of the WO.
12
 He was told in no uncertain terms by 
Macdonogh, who was technically his superior, that he retained full control over his office.
13
 
This belligerence in such situations did not deter Cumming from his ambition that his office 
would provide political and economic as well as military intelligence. Overall the 
independence of MI and MO ensured that by mid-1917, the WO had a good analytical 
capacity for measuring the German Army.
14
 Combinations of systems were implemented to 
promote unity and co-operation across these sections. The first was that the personnel of both 
MO and MI were fully interchangeable and repositioned regularly between both bodies.
15
 
The second was the creation of a sub-section, MO3, as a liaison department between MO and 
MI.
16
 It held weekly lectures by and for all heads of departments to ensure awareness and 
understanding throughout the staffs.
17
 This organisation of the General Staff was a positive 
factor in the growth of the BEF‟s intelligence analysis capability during the war, although the 
ambitions of both Cumming and Charteris ensured regular conflict.
18
 
 
In the months preceding Broodseinde, the WO built up an accurate picture of the make-up of 
the German Army. Both MI3 and MI1(c) had various means to analyse the enemy forces. 
MI3, amongst its many duties, had the important job of piecing together the enemy‟s order-
of-battle from the intelligence it received through the other offices.
 19
 The order-of-battle was 
an approximation of the health, strength and location of Germany‟s divisions opposite the 
British lines. Cox did not simply use espionage to achieve this: 
 
A great deal of information, and that not the least valuable was collected by perfectly 
legitimate means. The newspapers published at Kiel, Wilhelmshaven, and Danzig, to say 
nothing of the Berlin Journals, often contained, in spite of careful censorship, Service news 
which contained useful facts to the trained reader.
20
 
 
These sources could be acquired freely and easily enough through neutral states. Cox was an 
acknowledged expert on the enemy, with „an encyclopaedic knowledge of the German 
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Army‟21 having previously headed the German department at MI3. Cox himself, got much of 
his intelligence from MI1(c). Cumming was running a train-watching network in occupied 
Belgium. His „T Service‟ employed hundreds of agents whose job it was to report on troop 
movements. The German Army had a vast rail network in their occupational territories. By 
monitoring it carefully, these agents could record the changing locations of divisions, with 
accurate numbers of men, horses and guns in transit. Cumming‟s network was overseen by 
Captain Richard Tinsley stationed in the Netherlands, hence the name „T Service‟.22  It 
operated in competition with two other similar organisations run by GHQ; Major Cecil 
Cameron‟s and Major Ernest Wallinger‟s. Before 1917, it had suffered from the unhealthy 
competition between the organisations, which had led to serious mistakes.
23
 In 1916 the 
network was compromised and Tinsley was ousted as a spy. However, this proved to be a 
good change of fortune. Captain Henry Landau, who had been in charge of all military 
information from Tinsley‟s organisation, took over. By implementing many structural 
changes, such as the process for editing reports, Landau did much to turn the network around, 
so much that Cox commented on the quality of its work in February 1917.
24
 Importantly for 
Third Ypres, Landau was able to extend his network. In the summer months, he took control 
of La Dame Blanche, a highly effective network of citizens and families in occupied Belgium 
that had been operating in a smaller capacity under Cameron. They were distrustful of his 
organisation, fearing leaks. They requested, and were made into citizen soldiers. Because of 
this they grew into the largest and most successful spy ring of the war, although they detested 
the term.
25
 This meant that in the months leading to Broodseinde, Cox was able to confirm 
GHQ‟s train reports through the intelligence he received from Cumming.26 Indeed, by 27 
September 1917, with a new post in the network fully established, Landau doubted that, „a 
single troop train was missed‟.27  
 
Analysis of this information resided with MI3, but because no boundaries had been defined in 
terms of intelligence collection or analysis, it would also fall into GHQ‟s remit of information 
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concerning the enemy and the effects of attritional warfare on both the German Army and 
country. This led to the clashing of personalities, especially between Macdonogh and 
Charteris. Quickly, these analytical systems were called into question. The WO used 
questionable sources to assess German manpower. As mentioned the German press was 
utilised as a source of intelligence. German casualty lists, regularly published here, could give 
valuable clues to the manpower available to the German Army.
28
 They gave every man‟s 
unit, age and rank. However, both Cox and Macdonogh formed misgivings about the 
accuracy of these lists as they felt they were being doctored to keep the German public 
unaware of the scale of these casualties. By June 1917 they had stopped using them, turning 
to information provided by French intelligence and comparing their own casualty statistics.
29
 
These sources were good enough to ensure that, at a War Cabinet meeting, Macdonogh 
produced a paper that quashed Charteris‟ assertions that Germany was only months from 
capitulation.
30
 Good analysis also gave the WO a clear indication that, if Russia fell to 
another seemingly inevitable revolution, then it would free up almost three full armies for 
Germany to transfer to the Western Front.
31
 Both Haig and Macdonogh were extremely 
concerned about this. Letters in the weeks after the battle, made it clear that this was subject 
that had been receiving attention for some time.
32
 However Germany only began a mass 
movement of its troops between 7 November 1917 and 30 April 1918.
33
 
 
In terms of Germany‟s order-of-battle, Cox was instrumental in providing good quality 
analysis and distributing it accordingly. Cox had collected so much information on the 
German Army that „he carried most of it in his head‟.34  He produced an index distributing 
this knowledge across the BEF, entitled German Forces in the Field.
35
 Ensuring this book 
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stayed up to date proved a major operation. Six small books were published between March 
1915 and April 1918, by MI2(c).
36
 Additionally other publications by senior staff were also 
disseminated amongst the troops. In June 1917, Beach argues that, „the most significant 
volume...the Index of Infantry Regiments and Field Post Offices‟ was published.37 They were 
distributed to all ranks, in all fields of battle. They were the „Brown Books‟, the culmination 
of the WO‟s intelligence analysis.38 These were the peak of the WO‟s intelligence analysis 
before Broodseinde. They were a yardstick from which to measure and analyse future 
evolutions. „In many ways this handbook stands as a testimony to the development of the 
intelligence system over the previous four years.‟39 The WO was practicing a fundamental of 
intelligence analysis: to constantly observe, report and build upon that which was known.  
 
The WO‟s capacity for military intelligence in the months leading up to Broodseinde was 
good. They had a good organisation with delegations in every office. The restructuring of the 
General Staff meant that the role of intelligence within the British military began to change. 
MI became a professional and respected organisation and served the WO extremely well 
throughout the war. The staffs were well organised, and the hierarchical system was 
beginning to be cast aside to allow for quicker recruitment.
40
 Problematic to the unity of 
British military intelligence were the independence of its organisations. This repeatedly led to 
personality clashes, as evidenced by the arguments between Macdonogh, Cumming and 
Charteris. Ultimately the WO was able to monitor the German Army very accurately. This 
position allowed them to keep GHQ in check. Although this bred an unhealthy competition 
between the organisations, the information they were collecting and their analysis of it before 
Broodseinde was sound. 
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GHQ 
 
GHQ in France was the administrative centre for the BEF in France and Flanders. Its main 
intelligence duties lay in assessing the makeup and health of the German Army on the 
western front. To this end they were also concerned with building up Germany‟s order-of-
battle: 
 
As everyone knows the basis is the building up of the enemy‟s order-of-battle, for when this 
has been done the identification of one unit is prima facie evidence of the presence of the 
division to which it belongs, and possibly of the corps or even army.
1
 
 
This would provide „a vital gauge to measure German military stamina, and the exhaustion 
and corruption of those reserves would indicate that Germany‟s war effort was spent at last‟.2  
  
With Haig‟s arrival at GHQ in the winter of 1915 a greater emphasis was put on frontline 
intelligence. Brigadier-General John Charteris, who had been Haig‟s chief intelligence officer 
in both First Corps and First Army from 1914-15, benefitted from his patronage and became 
GSO1 Intelligence at GHQ. He was a contentious choice due to his personality but was well 
qualified for the job. Indeed his character saw him labelled by the Prince of Wales as „a 
shit‟.3 Throughout his tenure, however, GHQ Intelligence took on a greater importance.  
 
In August 1914 Colonel Macdonogh was the assigned GSO 1 Intelligence for GHQ. His 
small command gave him four sub-sections, the most important of which, I(a), had a total 
staff of two officers;
4
 a paltry number for an office that later become the most important in 
GHQ‟s analytical effort. By 1917, GHQ Intelligence had greatly expanded its responsibilities. 
These were separated into offices. I(a) Operational Intelligence was the largest, directed by 
Lieutenant-Colonel B.W. Bowdler.
5
 The other offices were: I(b) Secret Service; I(c) 
Topographical and Maps; I(d) Press; I(e) Wireless and Ciphers; I(f) Visitors; I(g) War Trade; 
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I(h) Censorship; and I(x) the administration of the Intelligence Corps.
6
 This amount of 
responsibilities created an „unwieldy‟ and inefficient organisation.7 This expansion was, 
along with the mass expansion of the BEF as a whole, neither rapid nor comprehensive. The 
two staff officers assigned to GHQ I(a) in 1914 had only become seven by 1917, though they 
benefitted from an additional attachment of three Intelligence Corps officers. This was 
progress, but GHQ never saw its intelligence section flourish quite like the WO. As an 
intelligence organisation it carried too many tertiary responsibilities like censorship and press 
handling, whilst maintaining only a minimum of staff to handle the analytical workload. 
Although the staffs were well trained and supported by intelligence officers, analytical 
discipline was poor.  
 
British high command suffered throughout the war from a lack of defined intelligence areas. 
As has already been discussed the remits of the WO and GHQ intelligence services 
overlapped. GHQ Intelligence summaries from the period regularly analysed both the 
German Army and German home front when it should have concentrated exclusively on the 
army. As a result of this assertions were often made based on unconfirmed sources. One 
example of this is a GHQ Intelligence Summary dated 24 September 1917.
 8
 This stated that 
diseases were ravaging Germany, particularly dysentery and typhus. The sources are given 
as, „the German Press of various dates‟.9 The summary then goes on to report on the morale 
of captured German officers. It stated that: 
 
A noticeable feature is the change of attitude of the German officers, who have lost 
confidence in the future, and have given up all idea of a military success on the part of 
Germany in the Western Theatre. The one topic which appears to interest officer prisoners 
now is the prospect of peace.
10
 
 
The reliability of information from prisoners could be dubious unless confirmed. Yet here, it 
is reported upon and unquestioned. The summary is at odds with itself further on: 
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Hostile counter-attacks continued on the evening of the 21
st
 on the Ypres front. 
Considerable German forces were engaged without any result being gained, except a heavy 
increase in the enemy‟s losses.11 
 
The summary continues describing the „heavy fighting‟ and how the enemy „attacked with 
great determination‟.12 Its descriptive language in this section does not tally with the previous 
statement that morale was very low. GHQ‟s analysis here suffered from poor deployment of 
sources. In the build up to Broodseinde, similar poor analytical discipline would fuel the most 
contentious issue of intelligence during Third Ypres; that of the question of German man-
power and morale.  
 
GHQ I(a) had been directed to carefully monitor the state of the German Army, particularly 
its reserves.
13
 This would indicate how many soldiers, and of what quality, German High 
Command could call upon. The greater the numbers killed, the more reserve units would be 
called up to fight. This cycle, it was hoped, would continue until Germany could no longer 
wage war. The information required to monitor this was relatively simple, as the German 
press had to issue notice of the call up of reserves. This combined with frontline observation 
and captured documents ensured that GHQ had a clear picture of this process.
14
 To monitor 
the German Army GHQ used captured pay books, collating their information to disseminate 
numbers.
15
 However, this source had its shortcomings; they only recorded wastage of 
conscription classes; they were not specific or detailed enough to provide wastage numbers 
for individual engagements and missing men were not accounted for, even if they had simply 
changed regiment or had gone to hospital.
16
 In spite of these facts, Charteris estimated 
German casualties for the battles of Arras, Champagne and the Aisne alone at 400, 000.
17
 The 
WO, later and using different methods, tabulated it as 132,000.
18
 This difference prompted 
huge debate and by August GHQ had changed its system to that of the WO‟s. The method 
adopted involved cross referencing the known numbers of the reserve classes with the 
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amount of prisoners taken, thus extrapolating the health of a division.
19
 This did combat the 
problem to some extent, but GHQ‟s estimates remained higher than the WO‟s throughout 
1917.
20
 Both offices used a system with an „arbitrary methodology‟,21 yet GHQ still seemed 
to be over-estimating during the build up to the battle. 
 
The other aspect of the German Army that GHQ I(a) was analysing was the morale of its 
troops. This was an extremely complex thing to measure. The raw information came from 
prisoner interrogations and captured documents. These sources themselves presented great 
trouble when used to monitor morale, and Charteris himself was critical about using such 
sources in this regard.
22
 By 1917, GHQ had moved to using captured documents as the 
primary means to assess German morale. However, the time it took to translate and process 
the information, combined with the paucity of such evidence unless advancing into German 
held territory, meant that this information was scattershot and nearly always outdated.
23
 A 
GHQ intelligence summary reported that „...there appears no doubt that the deterioration 
previously noted in the fighting qualities of the German troops has continued‟. 24 It cited 
various captured documentation to support this. A later summary reported on the use of 
German propaganda officers, both at home and in the army. These „Welfare Officers‟, were 
to „make every man clearly understand the necessity for continuing the war‟.25 On the 30th a 
report contained an extract of a letter saying, „...the moral[e] of the troops is nil. It is probably 
not the case with us only...everything that is done is done under extreme compulsion‟.26 This 
report was sent to the WO as GHQ‟s evidence of a continuing decline in German morale. 
This was poor analytical discipline on the part of GHQ I(a). Letters and statements like these 
did provide a good indication of an individual‟s morale but were snapshots of a certain 
feeling at a certain time. This intelligence had been placed out of context by GHQ and used to 
extrapolate on the health of units, formations, and the German Army as a whole.   
 
GHQ made some well debated analytical mistakes during the build up to the Battle of 
Broodseinde; however these over-estimations did not conceal the fact that the British war 
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effort was pushing Germany deeper into war weariness. GHQ intelligence did not over-
emphasise this but rather were too quick to assume that single sources of intelligence 
betrayed deeper problems. They suffered from a lack of analytical discipline. Two weeks 
after Broodseinde, Haig believed that the BEF‟s efforts were causing a „revolutionary‟ 
feeling within Germany.
27
 This was an optimistic analysis of the situation. Macdonogh 
carefully pointed out that not all factors were in place for a revolution,
 28
 but that: 
 
The best weapon to take advantage of this weakness is military pressure for it will more 
than anything else accentuate the internal dissensions and contribute more rapidly than any 
other measure to the undermining and final breaking of the German war-spirit which is our 
foremost war aim.
29
 
 
Haig‟s direction of Third Ypres was agreed upon as necessary, but poor analysis by GHQ 
gave him the impression that Germany was in far more severe circumstances than it was. 
Macdonogh did not believe that these differing statistics changed the situation, as he 
defended Haig:  
 
As regards the reserve [forces] available on October 1
st
, there is a difference between the 
calculations of Sir Douglas Haig and the Director of Military Intelligence respectively of 
720,000 less 500,000 – 220,000. It is not altogether surprising that two different officers 
should arrive at two different conclusions, and the difference is not great seeing that 
Germany has a population of 68,000,000.
30
     
 
This was written in the weeks after the Battle of Broodseinde, and was quoted verbatim by 
Robertson for the attention of the War Cabinet.
31
 The statement itself, therefore, was 
politically motivated and designed to show a unified front of the WO and GHQ to their 
political masters. 
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Ill-defined intelligence borders meant that the WO and GHQ overlapped their services 
unnecessarily. GHQ I(a) staff could not cope with the workload that evaluating Germany, the 
German Army globally, and the German Army on the western front brought. Because of 
these mistakes, Haig believed they were in a more positive situation before the Battle of 
Broodseinde than the WO did. Although shows of unity had been made after the 
disagreements over Germany‟s manpower and morale, the relationship between the two 
bodies had badly deteriorated. The real cause of these debates was the competing systems of 
both organisations and their over-lapping responsibilities. GHQ‟s system, in particular, was 
too susceptible to Haig‟s self-belief. In the summer of 1917, I(a) and Charteris found 
themselves applying intelligence analysis to further Haig‟s strategy. As such, the evidence 
they used was questionable as it had been hand-picked to back-up pre-existing notions. The 
WO had no such problems. They were able to offer better, more detached analysis, although 
both intelligence systems collected very accurate information and painted a reasonably 
accurate picture of the German Army during these months. 
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The Armies 
 
The BEF operated a structure that, although seemed very „top down‟, actually gave great 
freedom to the front line commanders when it came to the planning and execution of 
operations. This was thanks to the ethos of the BEF that allowed those in command nearer the 
front lines to assess the situation and develop battle plans accordingly. This was made official 
by the document „Field Services Regulations Part1‟ [FSR 1]. 1 The BEF, in 1917, utilised five 
Armies to direct operations against the German Army. The two that oversaw Broodseinde 
was Second Army under General Sir Herbert Plumer, and Fifth Army commanded by 
General Sir Hubert Gough. The structures and ethos of the BEF, however, led to varying 
qualities of intelligence analysis at this level.  
 
On 31 July 1917, the Third Battle of Ypres was launched after a problematic few months for 
Haig. The gestation phase had been fraught with political problems due to the pressures of 
coalition warfare. This had led to compromises, particularly concerning the balance the plans 
presented between breakthrough and limited advances.
2
 Eventually, the state of the French 
Army and French society meant that the War Cabinet was left with no other option but to 
support Haig‟s wishes.3  Haig originally gave command of the campaign to General Sir 
Hubert Gough and his Fifth Army, in the hope of securing a breakthrough. As the weather 
drastically deteriorated in the summer months, Gough had to delay the original date of the 
attack by three weeks. When they were launched, the preliminary battles of Pilckem Ridge, 
Westhoek and Langemarck failed due to the morass created by the weather and the ambitious 
targets that were set.
4
 The divisions could not progress to their ultimate objective, the „red 
line‟, 1000 yards away. By September Haig switched command of the campaign to Plumer, 
who was known for his methodical planning. Plumer utilised the „bite and hold‟ operational 
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method which saw immediate results and small advances made. He did not aim for a 
breakthrough as Gough had done but used his battles to achieve limited advances, pushing 
slowly but surely to the high ground behind Ypres.
 5
 Broodseinde was directed based on these 
principles.
6
 
 
The German Army had been utilising two defensive tactics up to this point. One was holding 
their frontline line regiments in staggered lines behind the front. This „defence-in-depth‟ 
policy would repel an advance by utilising many defensive lines to wear it down.
7
 The second 
tactic was to use Eingrief or „interlocking‟ divisions to enter the front quickly from the 
reserve lines and counter-attack after the British divisions were clear of their own artillery 
cover. They would then press this advantage under the cover of their own guns and rout the 
attackers.
8
 The combination of these defensive tactics and the weather had halted Gough‟s 
advance. The operational method used by Plumer had nullified this threat. They ensured that 
the attacking divisions went only so far into the thinly held German front line and then 
consolidated their position. Although this approach was the only answer to German defensive 
tactics it did mean that the divisions could not take immediate advantage of this success, 
having to wait for the line to consolidate before moving on. To stay aware of these changes in 
tactics and any further adaptations, both Second and Fifth Army required an expansive 
frontline intelligence system. 
 
1917 saw a great increase and emphasis on the BEF‟s analytical infrastructure, particularly as 
a result of the Intelligence Corps. This analysis was mainly recorded in periodic intelligence 
summaries. These summaries have already been looked at to some extent in this study. The 
War Office and GHQ produced statements on an „ad-hoc basis‟.9 The production of such 
statements within the lower organisations of the BEF was considerably more structured. 
Armies offered their appreciation every fortnight, combining the GHQ summaries with the 
reports from their Corps‟. Army, Corps and Divisional staffs also produced daily intelligence 
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summaries. All of these reports were collated at Army level, which served as the crux of 
operational intelligence analysis.  
 
The intelligence staffs of the two British Armies at Broodseinde differed greatly in the quality 
of their analytical output. Fifth Army‟s intelligence reports had strong foundations but 
suffered from poor analysis. Its GSO 1 Intelligence was Lieutenant-Colonel Harry 
Goldsmith.
10
 In August Goldsmith reported that „the situation is considered to be settling 
down after active operations and there is an opportunity of improving the existing 
defences‟.11 This was good analysis and correct. However, Goldsmith later stated „the 
enemy‟s dispositions show continued anxiety for the safety of his line opposite the southern 
portion of our front‟.12 This would suggest that measured improvement had devolved into 
some form of panic. This reported „anxiety‟ was not confirmed and was thus an assumption.13 
Another report stated that „the ZONNEBEKE group has been rather less active than usual 
probably owing to the action of our counter-batteries which have shelled the battery positions 
in this area, apparently with good effect‟. 14 No evidence was provided to prove this 
statement, nor was confirmation sought of the success of British counter-battery fire.
15
 This 
was another assumption. This report also seemed to ignore conclusions made the previous 
day: 
 
The enemy at times moves sections [of his artillery] into provisional emplacements with a 
view to attracting the enemy‟s attention so that another battery whose position has 
probably not been discovered can carry out effective fire...Prisoners have stated on 
several occasions that the enemy brings batteries forward at night to fire on our front lines 
and withdraws them to rearward positions as soon as they have finished shooting.
16
 
 
It is clear that analytical mistakes were being made. It is unfair to pin the blame solely on 
Goldsmith as the contradictions were also the responsibility of his staff. However, mistakes 
like this in the realm of intelligence could only obscure any analysis of enemy intentions. 
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Fifth Army‟s intelligence analysis was not very magnanimous in its assessment of the 
German divisions opposite them:  
 
There is, however, talk among the [captured] men that at least two guns of the 23
rd
 
R.F.A.R. [Reserve Field Artillery Regiment] placed in front of the “WILHELM 
STELLUNG” (3rd German Line) were hastily blown up for fear of their falling into our 
hands. While this statement must be accepted with reserve, it is certain that the 8
th
 battery 
of this regiment suffered heavy casualties, some of which were due to gas.
17
 
  
The implication of this statement is that counter-battery fire was more likely to be the cause 
of these destroyed guns and that evidence to the contrary should only be questioned first. A 
change in the enemy‟s situation was taken as a direct result of positive British action. No 
allowance was made for any British failings and due consideration was not given to the 
enemy‟s situation. Added to this, no confirmation was sought of these assertions. In this 
instance, Fifth Army‟s analysis suffered from prejudice. Their reports attributed enemy losses 
to British success and contradicted themselves when analysing intelligence, in both cases 
lacking sufficient proof. However, these reports do show that Fifth Army‟s tactical 
knowledge of the enemy was sound. In September, Goldsmith and his staff had correctly 
identified new German defensive tactics of using concrete blockhouses in the defence of their 
lines.
18
 Their front line observations showed that, „the enemy is evidently much disorganised 
on the whole front...and is attempting to re-arrange his order-of-battle; it is, therefore, 
difficult to arrive at a definite conclusion‟.19 Fifth Army‟s intelligence staff made severe 
analytical mistakes during this period, but thanks to the frontline intelligence system they 
were provided with an accurate picture of German defensive tactics and the deterioration of 
the divisions opposite their front.  
 
Second Army‟s GSO1 Intelligence was Lieutenant-Colonel Charles Mitchell.20 Mitchell‟s 
reports for Second Army were more disciplined in their analysis than Goldsmith‟s.  The 
language used in the reports is far less prone to ambiguity or bullish remarks. Second Army‟s 
reports were also less likely to jump to conclusions. An intelligence summary in August gave 
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a less optimistic picture of the enemy forces than Goldsmith‟s conclusions had. It stated that, 
„the infantry has shown considerable power of resistance‟.21 A further report in September 
also stated, „the necessity for keeping his front strongly held, however, probably forced the 
three regiments in line plan. To counteract this method, he has made unprecedented use of his 
counter-attack divisions‟.22 These reports made clear that Second Army, like Fifth, were 
aware of the constantly evolving German defensive tactics but were less prejudiced in their 
conclusions. Between August and September, Beach notes that Second Army observed a 
downwards trend in enemy morale. Divisions with „good‟ reputations were noted to have 
deteriorated,
23
 and Mitchell‟s report concurs with this; „the moral of prisoners varies 
considerably‟.24 Enemy artillery was also being effectively observed and updates were 
continuously charted into intelligence maps; ably supported by an organised cartographic 
section and well trained field survey teams.
25
 Second Army showed a deep awareness of the 
position of the German Army: 
 
By the evening of the 29
th
, the enemy had largely recovered from the confusion and 
disorganisation caused by our operations on the 26
th
 September. His immediate counter-
attack division (236
th
 Division)...had failed and had been withdrawn again in accordance 
with his with his known plan of operations.
26
 
 
In their analysis of October, Mitchell qualified their success: 
 
The thickening up of the line by the bringing in of Battalions and Regiments of Divisions, 
the confusion of units and the lack of cohesion in the counter-attacks proves how 
completely our former attacks have disorganised the enemy and with what haste he has 
been compelled to throw in his reinforcements.
27
 
 
Both Fifth and Second Armies had excellent knowledge of the enemy opposite their lines, but 
differed in their analytical discipline. To their credit Fifth Army emphasised the use of aerial 
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27
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photography to further their own intelligence picture. Their Field Survey Companies created 
topographically accurate models of the enemy trenches,
28
 pieced together from aerial 
photography.
29 
These were then studied by officers before commencing attacks. However, 
they were not always made available to all soldiers and sometimes kept behind closed 
doors.
30
  
 
Lieutenant-Colonels Goldsmith and Mitchell, respectively, were able to draw from excellent 
information but contrasted in their analyses. In the build up to Broodseinde the Armies of the 
BEF had great knowledge of the enemy‟s tactics and defences as well as his increased 
rotation of divisions. However they disagreed over whether this was due more too British 
success than to German failure. Thus their reports presented mixed messages when copied to 
their superiors. Haig was in constant contact with his Army, Corps and Division commanders 
so he might have been aware of such discrepancies.
31
 However, intelligence at this level did 
inform the Armies of the BEF in regard to the success or failure of their strategy. Fifth Army 
used photographic intelligence analysis to aid knowledge of the defences at Broodseinde but 
were let down by the performance of their staff. Second Army practiced better analytical 
discipline to ensure a clear picture was kept of the German Army opposite them by October 
1917. 
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The Corps 
 
The next level of command that utilised intelligence analysis was the Corps. Operating below 
the Army level, they were responsible for planning and executing operations in their sector in 
accordance with Army directives. Second Army would utilise IX, X, I Anzac and II Anzac 
Corps to execute the Battle of Broodseinde, whilst Fifth Army used XIV and XVIII Corps. 
This section shall also look at two more Corps, II and VIII because of the quality of their 
intelligence analysis. The role of the Corps was not simply „middle management‟.1 Thanks to 
FSR I, Corps staffs became semi-autonomous organisations with full responsibility for the 
planning and executing of operations passed down from Army staffs.
 2
 1917 proved to be a 
watershed year for the BEF as a number of past innovations began to reach their potential, 
not least of which was the expanding role of the Corps in the dual roles of intelligence 
analysis and executing operations. 
 
Before the Battle of the Somme the phrase, „Corps Command‟ was a misnomer.3 Up to 1915 
there existed only two Corps in the BEF, Haig‟s I Corps and Smith-Dorrien‟s II Corps. They 
served more as „promotional posts‟4 for their commanders and staffs.  During the battle of the 
Somme; with the expansion of the BEF and its administration, it was acknowledged that the 
Corps was far better suited to plan battles because of their local knowledge, and in 
compliance with FSR 1. Devolution of responsibility began to take place.  However these 
changes could not completely eradicate the problems that Corps officers faced. It was 
„apparent that Corps was still acting only as a medium of communication between GHQ, 
Army and Divisions, rather than taking a more active role in operations‟.5  Divisions would 
regularly pass through them, sometimes for as long as months and other times for as short as 
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a week.
6
 Because of this, little continuity or loyalty was imbued within the troops to their 
Corps.
7
 One description typifies their existence: 
 
A Corps Staff which had been well dug in for a year on a quiet front, resembled nothing so 
much as the menial hierarchy of a ducal palace – with the duke away. Never having had a 
division on their hands for more than a month or so they came to regard them as persons to 
be employed not encouraged. Their interest lay in the smooth airs which caressed Army and 
GHQ.
8
 
 
However, there were important areas that Corps Command did influence in the months 
preceding the battle. The staffs had taken on a more dominant role concerning artillery and 
infantry co-operation through the creation of the Counter Battery Staff Office [CBSO]. 
9
 
Corps Commanders were more able to follow a battle from zero hour onwards because of 
their liaisons with the Royal Flying Corps [RFC] unlike their superiors in the Army staffs, 
who had to rely on runners and inconsistent wireless and telephones.
10
 By early 1917 they 
were equally responsible with Army HQ for planning major offensive operations.
11
  Corps 
staffs also became responsible for the analysis of these operations, holding regular 
conferences on their successes and failures.
12
 This, in turn, increased the perception of 
intelligence analysis as a contributing factor to the outcome of Corps operations. 
 
The Corps of the BEF, by 1917, were extremely thorough in their intelligence analysis of the 
German Army in the build-up to Broodseinde. Thanks to the placement of two permanent 
Intelligence Corps officers at this level the quality of the intelligence could be quickly 
determined. Another change came in early 1917, when Charteris‟ lobbying upgraded the 
Corps staff officers (Intelligence) from General Staff Officer [GSO] 3 grade to GSO 2. This 
change, „greatly increased the status of intelligence work at this increasingly important level 
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of operational command‟.13 The reports of II Corps are good examples of the quality of work 
this brought. In March 1917, II Corps reported on steps taken by German divisions to hinder 
intelligence gathering on the frontline: 
 
A man belonging to a working party saw what he thought to be a button off of a German 
soldiers cap, and on picking it up found it was attached to a piece of string or wire. No 
sooner had he raised the button when he saw smoke issue from a tube... on the side of the 
trench. Directly after an explosion occurred, immediately followed by another, by which 
our man was seriously injured about the face, hands and leg.
14
    
 
 
On 20 March 1917, II Corps reported that, „No information of any value was obtainable from 
him [the prisoner]. He was stupid and has only rejoined his regiment a fortnight before so that 
his statement that the Germans would withdraw their line to behind CAMBRAI must be 
treated with reserve‟.15 II Corps intelligence staff was thus employing good discipline and 
control when assessing sources, as in this case they had stated that they would await further 
confirmation of the intelligence received but were showing good awareness of German 
counter-intelligence tactics.  
 
German divisions opposite other Corps were also being assessed. X Corps reported that „the 
9
th
 Abteilung [Division] had to go into the line again unexpectedly after 3 days rest on the 
morning of the 20
th
 September on account of our attack. They remained in the line until 
captured‟.16 X Corps were able to assess from prisoner reports that this relief had been 
surprising for the men of the 9
th
 Division and corroborated it from intelligence received on 
the same day concerning the location of the 9
th
 Division‟s rest billets.17 XVIII Corps reported 
that, in the same month, divisions were being rotated through the front line at least twice.
18
 
VIII Corps, further south, corroborated these reports that the German Army had to relieve its 
divisions more quickly than usual: 
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The 133 I.R. (24
th
 Division) was identified by contact just S.E. of Greenwood...last night. 
As this is a sector previously occupied by the 139
th
 I.R. the following conclusions may be 
drawn:- 
(1) The 133rd I.R. may have exchanged places with the 139th I.R. 
(2) The party may have formed an advanced patrol of a „Storm Trupp‟ which carried out 
the raid mentioned below. 
(3) The whole of the 24th Division may have side-slipped northwards. This is quite 
likely, as the 207
th
 Division, which has been in the sector N. Of it since August 2
nd
 
suffered heavily in the fighting of 20
th
 Sept. And may either be on the point of being 
relieved or may have contracted its front.
19
 
  
 
Across the front line at Third Ypres, analysis from separate Corps agreed that the German 
Army was struggling with the manpower available to it, because of the quicker rotation of 
divisions. They were also struggling with logistics. I Anzac Corps reported that the food 
given to the 75
th
 Infantry Regiment was „good, but only just sufficient‟.20 These conclusions 
pointed to an enemy that would have to employ reliefs out of desperation rather than by 
allotted timetables. Second Army concluded: 
 
The operations undertaken in the past fortnight have caused the employment and 
withdrawal of a considerable number of the enemy‟s divisions...owing to the confusion of 
the enemy‟s lines since 20th September; it is not possible to indicate exactly when a relief 
took place. Isolated parties of men of the out-going division have remained and 
occasionally been captured when the division proper had already been withdrawn.
21
 
 
These Corps reports painted a picture of a deterioration of the enemy‟s movements and 
logistics, as well as a deepening manpower problem. Across the line, analysis at this level had 
been disciplined. The accumulation and clarity of such analyses from multiple sources 
allowed for educated conclusions to be drawn higher up. In the days before Broodseinde 
Second Army was able to accurately, and without prejudice, assess the German Army: 
 
By the evening of the 29
th
, the enemy had largely recovered from the confusion and 
disorganisation caused by our operations on the 26
th
 September. His immediate counter-
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attack division (236
th
 Division)...had failed and had been withdrawn again in accordance 
with his with his known plan of operations.
22
 
 
General Plumer‟s operations seemed to be succeeding in pushing the German Army into a 
state of confusion and disarray. Thanks to a disciplined and well practiced system of 
intelligence analysis, brought about by the increased status of their intelligence staffs, the 
Corps of the BEF provided a clear picture of the extent of this decline. 
 
                                                          
22
 TNA: PRO WO/157/118, Second Army Weekly Summary, 27
 
September to 4
 
October 1917. 
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The Divisions 
 
The divisions that took part in the Battle of Broodseinde were the British 5
th
, 7
th
 and 21
st
 
under Lt. Gen Sir Thomas Morland‟s X Corps; the 37th under IX Corps; the 4th and 29th 
Divisions of XIV Corps and the 11
th
 and 48
th
 under XVIII Corps.
1
 Broodseinde also marked 
the first time that all of the infantry divisions from Australia and New Zealand attacked 
together. Lt. Gen. Sir W.R. Birdwood‟s I Anzac Corps had the 1st and 2nd Australian divisions 
whilst the 3
rd
 and New Zealand Divisions were attached to II Anzac Corps, commanded by 
Lt. Gen. Sir A.J. Godley.
2
 Of these the only British division that bore the brunt of Operation 
Hohensturm was the 48
th
 Division. The German 19
th
 Division, 45
th
 Reserve Division and 4
th
 
Guards were lined opposite the Anzac divisions. Therefore this section of the study shall look 
specifically at the history of these divisions and how intelligence operated within them. 
 
The divisions of the AIF went into Third Ypres as shock troops. GHQ had been very 
impressed with their success rate in the previous months. Haig had been very complimentary 
of the New Zealand Division‟s work during the Somme: 
 
The New Zealand Division has fought with the greatest gallantry in the Somme battle for 
23 consecutive days, carrying out with complete success every task set and always doing 
more than was asked of it. The division has won universal confidence and admiration. No 
praise can be too high for such troops. 
3 
 
Haig sent this letter directly to the New Zealand government, marking the division‟s trial by 
fire.
4
 Such praise increased the reputation of the Anzac soldier, and thus their work-load. 
There was a general feeling by August 1917 amongst the Australian divisions that they were 
being asked to do more than their British counter-parts.
5
 Although the 1
st
, 2
nd
 and 5
th
 
Australian Divisions had had four months rest before being brought into the line in late 
September, „the troops had seen too much hard fighting to welcome the prospect of more‟.6 
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This was acutely felt in 4
th
 Australian Division which had only received three weeks rest after 
Messines. Instead of going out the line as scheduled they were transferred to I Anzac to 
continue the offensive. As the official historian dryly commented, „it cannot be said that the 
news of the coming transference...was received with pleasure by the 4
th
 Division‟.7 Indeed, 
when the news was heard by the men, „audible protests [were heard] at the parade of at least 
one battalion‟.8  Major-General John Monash‟s fresher 3rd Australian Division fared little 
better during this time. They had lost 4,550 during its time in Messines.
9
 However, by 
Broodseinde, the Anzac divisions had been boosted by the previous successes of Third Ypres; 
„in the air was the unmistakable feeling...that the British leaders now had the game in hand‟.10 
It helped that no Anzac divisions had been called upon in a major offensive role until Plumer 
took control of the battle.
11
 This rest period had been a welcome relief.
12
 By the time the 
Anzac divisions moved into the line in September only the afore-mentioned 4
th
 Australian 
Division was in a poor state. This enforced commitment to the battle soured the morale of the 
men. The worst affected by this was the 14
th
 Battalion, were the relationship between the 
company commanders and their commanding officer had, „almost totally broken down‟.13 It 
was only thanks to the leadership of these company commanders that the battalion succeeded 
at capturing their objectives at Polygon Wood.
14
 This success meant that by the time of 
Broodseinde the morale of the Anzac divisions, including 4
th
 Division, was much improved.
15
 
The battle, for them, promised to continue the positive tempo that Menin Road Ridge and 
Polygon Wood had started.  
 
The predominance of the Corps in intelligence analysis combined with the intensity of the 
Anzac experience meant that divisional level analysis suffered with regards to Broodseinde. 
As the divisional staffs were so busy during operations, it was felt impossible to dedicate a 
GSO solely to intelligence duties.
16
 The responsibility for this fell upon the GSO3, the most 
junior rank. It was clear, however, that these officers were too busy „doing all the bottle-
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washing of operations‟.17 Officially the GSO3 was still in charge though, in practice, the 
trained Intelligence Corps officer became, „the de facto focus‟, within the staffs.18  
Unfortunately, this subordination led to inconsistencies and reports were not always written 
or at least archived. No complete intelligence files for the period during Third Ypres remain 
from the Australian divisions.
19
 Those singular reports that do survive are buried in the 
paperwork of the Divisional General Staffs.
20
 2
nd
 Australian Division‟s instructions to its 
intelligence officers for dealing with prisoners of war make it very clear that analysis at this 
level was not a priority. The instructions dictate that, „prisoners will not be delayed at the 
Advanced Corps Cage [set up as there was no divisional cage] longer than is absolutely 
necessary‟.21 A further instruction also insisted that intelligence was quickly passed up the 
line: „Divisional Intelligence Officers, after extracting all information of tactical importance, 
will forward the documents as soon as possible to the Corps Intelligence‟.22  
 
An explanation for this emphasis on Corps level analysis may lie within the New Zealand 
Division‟s intelligence summaries from October.  The New Zealand Division was „atypical‟ 
when it came to Intelligence. Major General Sir Andrew Russell was renowned for his 
attentive command style. He believed greatly in meticulous preparation for operations.
23
 It is 
unclear whether this attentive focus was also practised by the Division‟s intelligence staff but, 
the summaries issued contain careful reporting and clear analysis. One example of their 
meticulousness was from a summary which stated that „noises [were] heard‟ from „Dear 
House‟ that indicated enemy occupancy.24 This was confirmed the next day. Aerial 
photography showed that two enemy posts were clearly visible and two men were observed 
„carrying a long dark object, perhaps an M.G. [Machine Gun]‟ into the house.25 It is unclear 
what further observations or analyses were made here, as the report for 4 October 1917 is 
missing. In its place is a piece of paper saying, „Owing to operations of October 4th no 
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Divisional Summary was issued from the 2
nd
 to the 15
th
 October‟.26 This, actually, gives a 
more accurate indication of the problems of intelligence analysis at this level. The GSO3 had 
been too busy engaged in „bottle washing‟ during this period of activity to devote any time to 
intelligence work. Analytical work was considered to be subservient to operations preparation 
at this command level. Based on this evidence and the intelligence instructions as previously 
mentioned, it is clear that Intelligence Corps officers who were posted to divisional staffs 
were mainly responsible for the collation of intelligence from the lower formations. 
Occasionally they were able to methodically analyse these findings but most often had to 
forward them up the line „with the utmost despatch‟.27 
 
1917 saw the importance of intelligence analysis at the divisional level of the BEF grow, but 
only partially. The attachment of Intelligence Corps officers to divisional staffs was a 
measure, in part, to relieve the Divisional GSO 3 of the extra work that came with 
intelligence analysis. It meant that this function now had a dedicated supervisor within each 
division of the BEF. Intelligence work, however, was not well regarded in these staffs. 
Divisional GSO 3‟s were instructed, „to make himself and his lower officers familiar and 
ingratiating‟ within these staffs.28 Division HQ‟s seemed to be used as holding houses for this 
intelligence as it was collated, as instructions made it clear that all material should be brought 
to Divisional HQ as quickly as possible.
29
 This material was then passed to Corps for 
analysis. This would go some way to explain why intelligence reports of the British divisions 
that were employed in Broodseinde do not seem to exist.
30
  Some summaries of the divisions 
of the AIF do survive, although only partially. Analysis at this level could not receive the full 
attention of the officer assigned to it because of their myriad duties. One exception is evident 
in the New Zealand Division as the quality of their reports indicates a good intelligence 
infrastructure, possibly as a result of the attachment of Intelligence Corps officers. However, 
they were still subject to the main problem that intelligence analysis faced at this level. When 
under active operations, intelligence analysis was not a priority for divisions. Although 
efforts were made, frontline analysis necessarily gravitated upwards to the Corps in 1917.   
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The Intelligence Corps 
 
In 1914 the BEF began the war with a force designed for colonial warfare. It was made up of 
one army with two corps, each of which had two infantry and one cavalry division.
1
 Along 
with this, a small military cadre called the Intelligence Corps embarked for Belgium also.  
Field-Marshal Sir John French felt there was little need for a permanent field intelligence 
section.
2
 In 1904 provisions had been made to form an Intelligence Corps that would be 
linked more directly with the BEF‟s newly formed General Staff. 3 However it was not until 
1913 that a formation devoted solely to the gathering of intelligence was established. Its remit 
was: 
 
(a) To provide experienced officers with linguistic qualifications mounted on horses or on 
motor cycles or in cars. 
(b) To supplement Intelligence staffs of various headquarters which were obviously 
inadequate both in numbers and in the two essential foreign languages...French...and 
German. 
(c) To provide officers for the anticipated expansion of the Secret Service. 
(d) To provide the nucleus of a „Contre-espionage‟ organisation with the Army in France.4 
 
From this early stage, it was clear that the primary role of the Intelligence Corps was 
envisaged as espionage work.
5
 Although intelligence work was considered necessary the 
Intelligence Corps, like the BEF as a whole, had to adapt and take on new roles in this first 
total war.
6
 
 
In 1914, the Intelligence Corps was hastily assembled by Kirke and Macdonogh. Kirke, at 
this point a Major listed how many, and the types of recruits they were after: 
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The proposal of an „Intelligence Corps‟ and approximate numbers of officers are as 
follows: 
- Detectives (Scotland Yard) – 25 
- Officer Scouts (Motorcycles) – 25 
- Chauffeurs – 6 
- Cooks – 4 
- Commandant, Adjutant, Section Commander and Section Officers – 20.
7
 
 
 
The training, like the recruitment, was also hurried through and by the end of the month the 
fledgling Intelligence Corps had embarked for France.
8
 Because of these factors the officers 
of the Intelligence Corps were looked on by their contemporaries with contempt. In the early 
years of the war they were given menial tasks such as disembarking troops and running 
messages between HQs.
9
 They also suffered casualties, one example being Lieutenant A H 
Smith-Cumming, who died whilst chauffeuring his father, Mansfield („C‟ of MI1(b)), in 
October 1914.
10
 The misuse of intelligence officers like this left a wider problem: 
 
It was a fact that the analysis of intelligence often left much to be desired and that there was 
little, if any, mechanism for efficient analysis. Junior officers were simply not trained to do 
it and raw intelligence was often circulated to consumers...of more concern, it left 
individual consumers to analyse intelligence themselves.
11
 
 
In these early days the BEF had no real infrastructure for intelligence analysis at the tactical 
level. In 1916 intelligence analysis in the field was the focus of Army level staffs.
12
 This was 
so that Corps and Division staffs could focus solely on operations. Charteris himself 
described his intelligence department in I Corps during 1914 as a small tin box to put papers 
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in.
13
 From 1915 to 1917 this focus shifted due to the complexity of waging a large scale 
war.
14
 The Intelligence Corps had begun as a small sub-department of Military Operations 
[MO] 5, overseen by both Macdonogh in the WO, and Kirke at GHQ.
15
 As soon as the 
western front stabilised, the Intelligence Corps could no longer fulfil its remit as a forward 
scouting and collation unit. Instead it began to move into other areas. These were mainly in 
specialist posts in conjunction with the artillery, Royal Flying Corps [RFC] and photographic 
interpretation.
16
 Most importantly, the increase in these roles meant a proportional increase in 
staff.  
 
 
1916 had seen the BEF adapt to meet new demands of war; key of which was changes to its 
personnel. The Intelligence Corps had to grow both in size and in reputation to meet these 
demands.
17
 The methods of recruitment and training intensified. Intelligence Corps officers 
had previously been selected simply for their linguistic skills, and then given a month or so of 
frontline experience. This soon became a point of contention as they had „very little military 
knowledge‟.18 As a result of this, most Intelligence Corps officers were used by their GSO 
1‟s as subordinates and lackeys.19 After the Somme, efforts were made to improve this 
situation as new training schemes and schools were established.
20
 However, throughout the 
war, the personnel of the Intelligence Corps were limited by „the conservative military 
system‟.21 As has been discussed, Corps staffs did not enjoy stability of the divisions placed 
underneath them. It became the duty of the Intelligence Corps officers to provide this 
continuity during reliefs: 
 
One Intelligence officer from XVIII Corps Headquarters will remain with II Corps 
Headquarters until his services are no longer required. 
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XVIII Corps Intelligence will hand over to II Corps Intelligence Officer any relief maps, 
mosaics and stereoscopes in their possession. 
 
XVIII Corps Branch Intelligence Officer will remain with No. 7 squadron. 
 
Intelligence Officer XVIII Corps H.A. will remain with II Corps until Intelligence Officer 
II Corps H.A. is sufficiently acquainted with the situation.
22
 
 
 
Routine orders such as these charted the reliefs of the divisions of the BEF. Here II Corps 
relieved XVIII Corps on 26 October 1917 two weeks after they had helped to secure the 
Broodseinde ridge.
23
  
 
Having Intelligence Corps officers permanently attached to the staffs of the BEF was an 
important step in the evolution of their analytical discipline. In 1915 they were posted to the 
staffs of GHQ and Army level, but by January 1917 two Intelligence Officers were seconded 
to every Corps staff and one to every Divisional staff as well.
24
 These officers were, „at first 
regarded with the utmost suspicion but came to be realized as a most reliable source of 
information.‟25  It was chiefly the responsibility of these officers to collate and compile 
information to deduce orders of battle and enemy intentions. One such example comes from 
Second Army, who interviewed a, „German officer, captured by the French, states that the 
„08/15 pattern light machine guns have proved unsatisfactory owing to the constructional 
defects‟.26 This was then confirmed: 
 
The following extract from a battalion order tends to confirm the above statement...:- 
 
„Machine guns „08/15 must be treated with more care. Attention is again drawn to the fact 
that company commanders are responsible for these guns. Men who begin to lose parts of 
[these] guns on the way to the trenches should be punished.‟
27
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Evidence from the frontline was catalogued by the Intelligence Corps officers. In this 
instance it had helped to confirm intelligence regarding the quality of a weapon of the enemy. 
This information helped to give an idea of the current capabilities of the enemy to repulse an 
attack, not by itself but as part of a larger picture. Another captured document revealed a clue 
as to the enemy‟s signals procedure, „Enemy code words from noon 28th instant:-
Wytschaete=Petersburg; Ypres=Potsdam‟.28 This signals intelligence would have helped X 
Corps to assess the possible direction of an attack, whenever these code words were used. As 
a final example, the New Zealand Division‟s use of collated information to confirm an 
intelligence source identified a division opposite their line: 
 
 IDENTIFICATION 
(a) The three prisoners belong to the 10th company, 3rd Battalion of 77th Infantry Regiment, 
20
th
 (Prussian) Division. They were captured in DOCHY FARM D.15.c 
(b) A man of the same company of the same regiment was shot by us last night about D.14.b 
and identified by papers. He had a full pack up and came from a northerly direction.
29
 
 
 
This system of collation and confirmation was put into place thanks to a well-organised and 
expanded Intelligence Corps. The experience of these officers in identification of battlefield 
detritus, interrogation of prisoners and assessment of documents meant that frontline 
intelligence became, „the bedrock of the British Intelligence system‟.30 The reality of being 
an Intelligence Corps officer differed depending on the level at which they were used. Most 
often within division staffs they were strictly dissuaded from providing official staff opinions 
on intelligence and were often delegated with all of the staff officer‟s mundane work.31 This 
was because analysis was not required at this level, so their job, in reality, was to collect the 
intelligence and decide what needed to be escalated. At the Corps and Army level they were 
utilised more proactively, as this was were the main analysis of frontline intelligence took 
place. The expertise of these officers correlated to the better use of these frontline sources. 
One strengthened the other. By 1917 frontline intelligence was the main tool to keep the 
German order-of-battle up to date. The train-watching networks would simply confirm what 
was already known; 
 
                                                          
28
 TNA: PRO WO/157/449, X Corps Intelligence Summary 27 September 1917. 
29
 TNA: PRO WO/157/621, New Zealand Division Intelligence Summary 2 October 1917. 
30
 Beach, „British Intelligence‟, p. 41. 
31
 Ibid, p. 128. 
40 
 
Indicators could be new activities revealed by an air photograph; identifications found upon 
prisoners showing the arrival of new divisions; the discovery of a new issue gas mask in 
February 1918, which helped the Intelligence Branch at GHQ to predict the exact date and 
hour of a German attack upon the Fifth Army. 
32
  
 
 
The specialist training and expertise of the Intelligence Corps officers combined with good 
analytical discipline helped piece together the jigsaw of the German Army. It was thanks to 
the rise of the Intelligence Corps as a professional body that allowed this organisation to play 
an important role in the build up to Broodseinde.   
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Conclusion 
 
Broodseinde was an important step for the BEF to ensure they kept a positive operational 
tempo. The campaign had been controversial at its inception and throughout the planning 
phases. It had become even more so by the time General Plumer took command due to the 
heavy casualties taken by Fifth Army. Although the later battles of Menin Road Ridge and 
Polygon Wood were successes, they were limited advances. This approach had been made 
necessary because of an ambitious strategy that had been compromised, both by politics and 
Fifth Army‟s failure to achieve a breakthrough.  
 
By October 1917, the BEF had a good intelligence system in place from which to measure its 
adversary. Although the system had its problems it functioned effectively during the build up 
to Broodseinde. GHQ made serious mistakes in its intelligence analysis in the period before 
the battle. These were highlighted due to the conflicting personalities between them and the 
WO. Macdonogh and Cox were united in their dislike of Charteris who was ultimately made 
a scapegoat. However, thanks to reforms by Charteris of the intelligence infrastructure within 
the BEF and the restructuring of the General Staff, intelligence analysis operated well 
throughout the formations below GHQ.  
 
At the levels of Army and Corps, intelligence analysis functioned well. Whilst Second 
Army‟s intelligence staff produced reports that were models of discipline, Fifth Army‟s 
reports were weighted somewhat with assumptions about the cause of the German Army‟s 
problems. This may have been the result of issues within the Fifth Army senior staff that 
produced a climate of fear.
 1
 However, it is apparent from both these formations that they 
shared an excellent understanding of the German order-of-battle and the fighting quality of 
German divisions. This allowed Second Army, on whose front Operation Hohensturm took 
place, to assess the manpower of the German Army with some accuracy. Accurate reporting 
by the Corps and Divisions during this build up showed that the BEF had the tactical 
advantage and began to illustrate the failure of German defence-in-depth tactics to repel these 
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limited attacks. This failure was badly affecting German morale, as the Corps‟ monitoring of 
the quickening rotation of German divisions through the front line illustrated. This 
knowledge was instrumental in allowing both Fifth and Second Army to measure the effects 
of this step by step approach. Intelligence analysis at these levels was largely successful at 
showing the pressure and severity of the German Army‟s position in the build up to 
Broodseinde. Indeed, the BEF‟s ability to keep an up-to-date order-of-battle at all times was 
one of their greatest strengths in intelligence analysis throughout the war.   
 
Intelligence analysis within lower formations received mixed priorities and was only cursory 
below division level. During quiet periods on the front time and resources could be given by 
divisions to patrolling and other intelligence activities. When on active operations, however, 
their staffs had too much administrative work to do to purely concentrate on monitoring the 
German Army. Because of the myriad duties of the GSO 3 analysis received varying amounts 
of attention from division to division. The most important development of intelligence 
analysis with the BEF however was the growth of the Intelligence Corps. This body 
underpinned the quality of both the intelligence and its analysis at the levels of Army and 
Corps. As such, in order to accurately assess the intelligence analysis at Broodseinde it is 
these levels that become the most important. Some quick analysis did take place in the field, 
but only if the „information [was] of tactical importance‟.2 From here, the analysis was then 
usually distributed upwards rather than the reverse, although there are indications that it was 
passed down the line as well.
3
 By ensuring intelligence analysis remained most important at 
Corps and Army levels, the BEF had created a system that allowed for a good cross-
referencing of information from a wide range of sources before judgements were made.  
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Introduction 
 
This second chapter of this study will now look into the intelligence picture in the immediate 
run up to the Battle of Broodseinde on 4 October 1917. By doing this it will be able to paint a 
fuller picture of how the BEF utilised intelligence before a major operation. The first part of 
this thesis has established how the BEF‟s intelligence system operated and how the battle 
itself fit into the wider context of the conflict. It has also demonstrated how the system in 
particular was functioning in the months preceding the battle. This part of the thesis will 
utilize the primary sources from GHQ, Army, Corps and Divisional levels during the period 
from 28 September to 3 October, the night before Broodseinde. This is for two reasons. The 
first is that some of the most useful intelligence was received from newly captured prisoners, 
as has been discussed earlier. Obviously there was a higher likelihood of catching prisoners 
during major operations. Although prisoners were caught locally during this period, the 
majority would have been caught due to the British line extending as a whole. The last such 
major operation that accomplished this was the Battle of Polygon Wood on 26 September 
1917. However, for reasons of space the immediate aftermath of Polygon Wood will not be 
covered. Instead this part of the study shall detail one week leading up to the battle; the 
period of 28 September to 3 October 1917. Any relevant material from the days before this 
period may be incorporated to provide context for that specific day‟s analysis. The second 
reason for selecting this time period is that the daily intelligence reports were always written 
in the evening, usually between 6 and 8pm, covering the last twenty four hours. Therefore the 
reports from 3 October represent the latest information available before the troops went over 
the line at 6am. The reports dated 4 October were written after the battle had taken place and 
therefore contain only retrospective analysis. The aim of this part of the thesis is to ascertain 
exactly what was known or perceived about the German divisions and their intentions before 
this failed attack. Therefore it shall focus particularly on the reports of the formations directly 
involved, namely Second Army, X Corps, I Anzac Corps, II Anzac Corps, 1
st
 Australian 
Division, 2
nd
 Australian Division and New Zealand Division. Information from the 4 October 
will be utilised when concluding the study‟s findings.  
 
 
45 
 
28 September 1917 
 
Two days after the Battle of Polygon Wood the German Army was reported to be in 
„confusion‟.1 It was clear that the German divisions had retreated to the main defensive line 
in the area, the Broodseinde Ridge, which held much of their artillery positions. This was 
strengthened by various secondary defensive lines and positions. The quality of these 
positions and the numbers of soldiers holding them was studied in detail. II Anzac Corps 
reported that, opposite their front: 
 
The enemy‟s MAIN LINE DEFENCE [sic] is the ZONNEBEKE-STADEN line 
which...runs practically due north and south about 500 yds. east of ZONNEBEKE Church. 
This line consists of a single line of trenches which have not been properly completed. A 
good deal of concrete work has been done and the line completely wired though this wire at 
present would not appear to be a formidable obstacle. There are no communication trenches 
leading to the rear. West of this line the enemy holds shell hole positions supported by a 
number of scattered concrete dugouts.
2
  
 
II Anzac had identified that the main line of defence for the divisions opposing them was 
incomplete and fairly isolated. They identified that the two divisions using it, the 4
th
 Bavarian 
Division and the 44
th
 Reserve Division would be using the defensive tactic of fortifying shell 
holes in this region.
3
 The report then described how these defences were bolstered by: 
 
The PASSCHENDAELE-TERHARD line. A great deal of work has recently been done on 
this system, which forms a switch line in the event of our capture of the BECELAERE-
BROODSEINDE Ridge. An official German map dated 21 September shows the line heavily 
wired but the trenches very incomplete.
4
 
 
Although these defences were as yet incomplete, it seemed likely that this work was the 4
th
 
Bavarian Division consolidating its position. Concrete positions, such as had been identified, 
had already played a large part in the Battle of Polygon Wood
5
. Their use was a known 
German counter-measure thanks to the BEF‟s experience in this battle and this information 
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made clear that it would be deployed again. The lack of a complete trench network also 
indicated that the German divisions were reliant on fortified shell holes as defensive infantry 
positions. This had already been confirmed by I Anzac Corps, who published their translation 
of a set of captured German orders dated 10 September 1917: 
 
 
When, as in the case of Company A, no small pieces of trench are already dug, the foremost 
shell craters are to be joined together in such a manner as to provide positions for groups 
(i.e. 1 NCO and 6 men). The crater-field in between the „group‟ positions is to be filled in 
with barbed wire, to hinder the enemy establishing posts.
6
 
 
  
This information was widely confirmed across Second Army‟s front, „the enemy is 
occupying shell-hole nests, concrete dug outs, remains of battery positions etc, and he has no 
connected defensive system in the forward area‟.7 It was clear to the Second Army that this 
German defence system was flawed and that, in the cases of the 4
th
 Bavarians and 44
th
 
Reserve, it was still being used.  
 
The importance of knowledge of the enemy‟s order-of-battle was also demonstrated from the 
reports from this day. I Anzac identified at least four enemy reserve divisions opposite their 
lines; the 17
th
, 19
th
 Reserve, the 236
th
 and the 3
rd
 Reserve Divisions.
8
 They were able to 
discover that the 19
th
 Reserve Division was relieving the 17
th
 Division through a set of 
circumstances that further elaborated the difficulty of the German Army‟s position. The 
report first stated that, „the enemy made a raid on the 5th Divisional front early this morning, 
but was repulsed; with the exception of 9 prisoners, the entire party was killed‟.9  During 
interrogations these men were members of the 73
rd
 and 92 Reserve Infantry Regiments, of the 
19
th
 Reserve Division. They were in the process of relieving the 17
th
 Division, which had 
itself relieved the 50
th
 Division only two days before. They had not been making an attack but 
had, „been caught by our nightly harassing fire, and then lost their way‟.10 They had 
obviously sheltered in shell holes for the night because, „when dawn broke they found 
themselves quite close to our troops who opened fire on them. A large number of their 
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company was killed‟.11 This event highlighted, „the confusion and disorganisation caused by 
our operations‟.12 It was clear that the German High Command was rotating its divisions 
much more quickly than expected, in order to maintain morale and fighting fitness, and that 
the German Army was having trouble adapting to Second Army‟s „bite and hold‟ methods.  
 
II Anzac Corps had also identified two divisions on its front; one in particular gave it cause 
for concern. I Anzac Corps faced the 19
th
 Reserve Division, who had very little frontline 
experience.
13
 The same could not be said of the 4
th
 Bavarian Division opposite II Anzac 
Corps. They held practically the entire line opposite them; a „divisional frontage of 2800 
yards‟.14 Each German division was comprised of three regiments. Then, „each regiment has 
one battalion in the front area, the second in support about the ZONNEBEKE-STADEN line, 
the third in reserve in hutments...i.e. 4000-6000 yards from the front‟.15 This placement was 
consistent with the German defence-in-depth policy, with large distances between lines of 
defence ready for an enemy that would try to break through the lines. Second Army were 
well aware of this tactic and noted it was being adapted: 
 
The enemy had reverted to the normal method of holding a divisional sector by putting all 
three regiments in line, distributed with one battalion in line and the support and reserve 
battalions well up in close reserve... 
 
The necessity for keeping his front strongly held, however, probably forced the enemy to 
adopt the three regiments in line plan. To counteract the weakness of this method, he has 
made an unprecedented use of his counter-attack divisions.
16
 
 
 
II Anzac confirmed this by noting that the front battalions were spaced out as per this 
policy.
17
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The 4
th
 Bavarian was one such counter-attack division that Second Army had referenced. II 
Anzac Corps had already amassed a good amount of information on this division. Its 
commander was Major-General Prince Franz of Bavaria and it had „arrived in the area on the 
26
th
 inst., when it relieved the 23
rd
 Reserve Division‟.18 It is obvious that the arrival of this 
division concerned II Anzac Corps as the daily report devotes a lot of space to it. It stated that 
„[the 4th Bavarian Division] had previously been in the ARMENTIERES sector since the 
beginning of July, but does not appear to have had many casualties on that front‟.19 However 
the division and its reserves had suffered during the relief from this area: 
 
During the relief...incoming units suffered very heavily under our intense artillery fire, in 
particular the 2
nd
 Battalion, 5
th
 Bavarian Reserve Infantry Regiment. The company trench 
strength may now be said to average out about 80. The moral of the division appears to be 
indifferent and had probably suffered through a prolonged stay on a quiet front.
20 
 
A new, freshly rested division was now in the line, specifically one with a history as an 
adversary of the Australian divisions.
21
  
 
The day had passed with both Anzac Corps being confident of their position. The German 
Army was confused and having to adapt to the BEF‟s dictation of the battle. As a result of the 
campaign German reliefs were increasing, with some divisions now being passed through the 
front line twice.
22
 The defensive measures taken were piecemeal and temporary. It was, 
perhaps, unsurprising that Charteris wrote to his wife that day, „Things are going very well in 
the battle and the Germans are far nearer to giving in than ever before‟.23 Although the 
German Army was obviously experiencing great losses during these days, it was optimistic of 
Charteris to suggest they were close to giving in. GHQ was aware that the German retreat 
was sudden and disorganised, although they were equally aware that they were falling back to 
an established position. The BEF controlled the tempo of the campaign. The intelligence 
collected during this day painted an encouraging picture. 
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29 September 1917 
 
This day passed relatively quietly as it was stated, „the situation this morning is unchanged. 
There is nothing of importance to report‟.1 However a number of observations were made by 
both Anzac Corps on high enemy activity during this day. 
 
I Anzac Corps noted that their artillery was maintaining „harassing fire‟ throughout the day.2 
By ensuring the German Army was kept busy in this way they could observe much of their 
defences and activity. Hostile artillery, in particular, was, „above normal‟.3 However, thanks 
to new technologies the direction of the shells could be assessed with some accuracy: 
 
The following places were shelled: 
WESTHOEK from the direction of OESTHOEK and BROODSEINDE 
HELLFIRE CORNER from the direction of OESTHOEK 
YPRES from the direction of BECELEARE and KEIBERG 
HOOGE with gas shells from HOLLEBOSCH and KEIBERG.
4
 
 
This was analysed by Second Army as harassing fire, and these positions were confirmed by 
2
nd
 Field Survey Company as seven groups of batteries with the RFC spotting, „84 flashes‟.5  
These actions indicated that the German batteries were trying to cover the activity of their 
infantry in reorganising their defences. The counter-battery work that they undertook was 
also for this purpose as aerial photographic intelligence made clear. The RFC had last 
conducted an aerial reconnaissance of the enemy positions on the 27 September. The 
specialist photographic analysis section had noted several positions of interest. North of 
Zonnebeke Church four posts had been made with two adjoining trenches which were, „full 
of troops‟.6 Dochy Farm was reported as „nil‟.7 By the 29 September British advanced posts 
were recorded at Zonnebeke Church to monitor this activity and at Dochy Farm.
8
 Intelligence 
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had influenced local operations as, only two days after they were first reported, observation 
posts had been established to further monitor these enemy positions. It was also clear that 
new areas were being adapted for defensive purposes. At Israel House, a position not reported 
on the 27 September, new trenches were observed leading to what was, „probably an 
advanced post‟.9  
 
I Anzac Corps was also monitoring the state of the divisions manning these posts. The 15
th
 
Reserve Division and 3
rd
 Reserve Divisions were adapting the defences available to them. 
These adaptations were not major works but would slow local operations, being as they were 
using old trenches and fortifications which had been damaged already in the campaign. This 
was confirmed by prisoner interrogations from this day, as were the identifications. An NCO 
of the 3
rd
 Reserve Division had indicated that, „in this sector, the light trench mortars were in 
shell holes and medium ones were in old emplacements‟.10 The prisoner also stated that, 
„moral[e] is fairly good, mainly owing to the rations which are good and plentiful, and also to 
the fact that the company has been very little in the line recently‟.11 This was compared to a 
prisoner from the 75
th
 Infantry Regiment, 17
th
 Division, who should have been out of the line 
as they had already been relieved. He stated that, in his detachment at least, „the moral was 
poor...as the men did not think they should be sent forward again without any rest‟.12 Along 
the line of I Anzac Corps, enemy morale differed according to individual experiences.  
 
I Anzac also made a notable intelligence assessment that further pointed to the declination of 
the German Army‟s position. At the Zonnebeke-Staden line, „the enemy does not appear to 
have been working on his defences‟.13 The line was noted to be, „very battered and in places 
non-existent‟.14 Further analysis revealed why this was so: 
 
The enemy‟s tenacious resistance and repeated counter-attacks in the recent fighting, show 
how thoroughly awake he is to the threat of that part North of the BROODSEINDE-
BECELAERE Ridge, where our line is now within a short distance of the Eastern edge. 
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At present he still retains the advantage of being able to concentrate troops under cover of 
this ridge, and in his efforts to retain it, further severe fighting and strong resistance can 
certainly be expected. 
 
That the enemy fully appreciates the situation was clearly indicated by the disposal of his 
counter-attack regiments, and the promptness with which they came into action in the 
fighting of 26 September.
15
 
 
 
Heavy resistance in this area had been expected from as early as the 26 September. Second 
Army had been well aware of the importance of this position to the enemy, hence why this 
ridge was the main target of the Battle of Broodseinde. „It is apparent that he [the enemy] 
recognised this attack [Polygon Wood]...as the most critical one in our general advance 
toward the remaining positions on the Gheluvelt-Zonnebeke ridge which he has so 
desperately defended‟.16 It seemed that the German divisions were consolidating this ridge at 
the expense of the Zonnebeke-Staden line. One critical piece of analysis in the report 
furthered this, „it seems clear from prisoners‟ statements that he did not expect us to attack on 
such a wide front; our attack was not expected by his front line troops North of Polygon 
Wood‟.17 Although this was in the context of the Battle of Polygon Wood, it was a lesson that 
was to be repeated upon the German Army at Broodseinde. This would explain why they 
were, during this period, only lightly reinforcing the Zonnebeke-Staden line but tenaciously 
the Broodseinde-Becelaere ridge. Second Army believed they were either expecting a smaller 
attack to take the ridge only or were not aware at this time of the length of front line to be 
attacked. Either way, they were consolidating their strongest position as much as possible at 
the expense of the rest of their line. Lieutenant-Colonel W. Robertson, the GSO 1 Operations 
in Second Army wrote „by the evening of the 29th, the enemy had largely recovered from the 
confusion and disorganisation caused by our operations on the 26
th‟.18 Although these other 
defences would be hard fought come the battle, the German Army had clearly marked its 
priority as the Broodseinde Ridge and had begun to successfully consolidate its position 
there. That Second Army was able to identify this was a key factor in furthering their success 
on the 4 October. 
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30 September 1917 
 
The major reliefs that occurred on this day and completed by 1 October were not German but 
British divisions. The 1
st
, 2
nd
, 3
rd
 Australian and New Zealand Divisions under both Anzac 
Corps relieved the outgoing V Corps and adjusted their lines accordingly.
1
 Both I and II 
Anzac Corps had been in the front line since 27 September 1917.
2
 X Corps replaced V Corps 
during this period, and took some of the line from I Anzac Corps so that they were opposite 
the 4
th
 Bavarian and 19
th
 Reserve Divisions. The study will look at its intelligence reports 
from this point on, as well as new material from the divisions already mentioned.
3
 
 
X Corps had been in the line not twenty four hours before they had to fend off a counter-
attack by the 19
th
 Reserve Division, the formation that I Anzac Corps had identified arriving 
opposite its line two days ago: 
 
At 1.30 am it was reported that the Germans were massing at J.16b. Patrols were sent out 
and this was found to be correct. A barrage was therefore arranged at 4.45am and was put 
down to good effect. About 5.15 am the enemy were seen to be advancing to the attack with 
their left on the YPRES-MENIN Road.
4
 
 
The report continued: 
 
Visibility was poor despite the moon by reason of a ground mist; while it was further 
impaired by the Germans‟ use of smoke bombs and flammenwerfer. Despite these 
advantages the front line garrison overwhelmed the attack...before it could reach our 
trenches. About 6 am the attack was renewed...but again the enemy was driven off leaving 
two prisoners and one M.G in our hands, while the ground in front of our lines was strewn 
with his dead.
5
 
 
The counter-attack was pressed until 8 am when it was finally dispersed by „the very heavy 
artillery fire that was turned onto him‟.6 In total three prisoners were captured. From these 
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men immediate observations were made. The attack had been made by the 92
nd
 and 78
th
 
Reserve Infantry Regiments of the 19
th
 Reserve Divisions.
7
   This information was shared 
across the line confirming to I Anzac Corps the identifications they had already made.
8
 Only 
preliminary identification and information could be taken from them at this moment, as they 
were processed into the Corps cage for further interrogation. This counter-attack however, 
was a clear signal that the German Army was no longer „confused‟ as Second Army had 
reported two days ago. 
 
I Anzac Corps also saw increased enemy action after the previous two days, although not to 
the degree experienced by X Corps. They reported that German artillery had „shown normal 
activity‟ and had come from the directions of „KEIBERG, BROODSEINDE and 
DROOGENBROODHOEK‟.9 They also confirmed that „two attempted attacks on the right 
Division front‟ were dispersed with their heavy artillery and that they took one prisoner from 
the 92
nd
 R.I.R., 19
th
 Reserve Division.
10
 I Anzac Corps made a good deal of observations 
regarding enemy mortar positions and sniper posts on this day.
11
 However, it was the 
interrogation from prisoners of the 92
nd
 R.I.R., 19
th
 Division that provided the most 
information about the health of the Division. It also confirmed the reasons for the quick relief 
of the 17
th
 Division on the 28
th
 „after only one day in the line was made necessary by the 
heavy losses of the former‟.12 The attack made that morning against X Corps had been 
intended „to cut out the “zig-zag” in the German position and to secure a regular line‟.13 Thus, 
the information these prisoners gave validated previous intelligence that the German 
divisions had re-organised themselves and were pressing a sustained defence according to 
their known defensive doctrine.   
 
It was quieter on the front for II Anzac Corps although they made an important assessment 
that day. They confirmed that the Zonnebeke-Staden line was being neglected, as I Anzac 
Corps had observed the day before, thanks to captured documents. In some very clear 
analysis they reported: 
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The study of aeroplane photographs taken during the last few days reveals no trace 
whatever of any trench work being done by the enemy West of the ZONNEBEKE-
STADEN line. This line itself has been very badly damaged and appears in poor condition. 
Those pieces of trench which exist appear shallow.
14
 
 
The only area where they observed any maintenance of these defences was an intersection 
between the main line and the Bellevue Spur.
15
 By correlating this information with their 
existing intelligence, II Anzac Corps found this lack of maintenance surprising: 
 
In view of the fact that captured German maps show that a considerable amount of new 
defence work had been projected in this area-including a great deal of wiring- this lack of 
work on the part of the enemy is somewhat remarkable.
16
 
 
This was an indication of the disarray the German Army was now in, but more importantly of 
the further consolidation of their defensive position. The German Army had planned for a 
great deal of defensive build up in this area but had abandoned their plans. II Anzac Corps 
assessed these developments carefully: 
 
It seems probable that the enemy is at present determined to hold the whole area west of the 
ZONNEBEKE-STADEN line merely as a crater position in spite of the fact that he must 
have at least three battalions west of this line. 
 
On the other hand he may be tempted by the present lull in operations to construct a line 
along the GRAVENSTAFEL ridge. The erection of new wire should in particular be looked 
for.
17
 
  
 
It was obvious to Second Army why this ridge had been neglected, as their staff observed the 
wider picture of this consolidation of German forces. The German Army was pulling back 
towards the Broodseinde and Passchendaele ridges. They had noticed new trenches and dug-
outs on the Passchendaele-Terhard line in particular,
18
 and the re-arrangement of their heavy 
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artillery into four large groups.
19
 Mitchell noted that „very little new [defensive] work has 
appeared in forward areas during the last fortnight‟.20 This was due to „the belief that our 
offensive is toward obvious objectives‟.21 As such it was clear that the German defensive 
position was to re-enforce only the most tactically important or defensible areas, like the 
Broodseinde Ridge leaving those positions less important to decay, as the Zonnebeke-Staden 
line was doing. From their analysis the previous day, Second Army had a validated and clear 
understanding of German defensive policy and important areas three days before the Battle of 
Broodseinde. 
 
Second Army had also accurately predicted the strength of the German counter-attack on X 
Corps‟ front. They had been aware that counter-attacks were likely and that the German 
Army had largely recovered from their confusion on the 29
 
September. Presciently, Mitchell 
wrote „the enemy doubtless appreciates that his policy of counter-attack has failed, and that, 
as our offensive will continue, he must organise his counter attacks and defences on a much 
more comprehensive scale‟.22 This was a very important statement. It accurately recognised 
that the German Army was changing its defensive tactics and moving towards much more 
large scale counter-attacks.
23
 Mitchell continued: 
 
Local counter-attacks will of course continue...but should these fail it is unlikely that he 
will use up all his intact counter-attack units and reserves by flinging them too hastily into 
battle. It seems more probable that he will rely more on his artillery to keep our attack 
within bounds...In fact his future defensive policy may probably be in the nature of a 
carefully prepared counter-offensive which would take place one or several days after our 
attack and when the position in the forward areas had resumed a more or less normal 
aspect.
24
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This was excellent analysis by Second Army‟s intelligence staff. The events of the next day 
would prove its accuracy. By assessing the reliefs, artillery arrangement and aerial activity,
25
 
Second Army concluded that „he [the enemy] will doubtless make another similar attempt in 
the same place or somewhere on the battle line within the next two days‟.26 The attack 
opposite X Corps was one such carefully prepared counter offensive. They had accurately 
gauged the intentions of the enemy and the changing of his counter-attack policy. Although 
Second Army had failed to predict where that attack would come, it had passed this 
information to all corps and divisions along its front, as this document was within II Anzac 
Corps archive. In the days before Broodseinde, the BEF was accurately charting the 
intentions and tactics of the German Army opposite their front. 
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1 October 1917 
  
The only available divisional intelligence summaries from this period are those of the New 
Zealand Division. They cover the days of 1 and 2 October 1917. As stated before, they are 
the only division during this period whose intelligence papers have survived, unlike the 1
st
 
and 2
nd
 Australian Divisions. Much more problematic to this study is the state of the 
intelligence archives in respect of I Anzac Corps. This Corps and the divisions under it 
inflicted much of the devastation to the German 4
th
 Guards Division on 4 October 1917. The 
formation‟s intelligence documents of the month of October do not seem to have survived. In 
the National Archives the files simply skip this month, going from September 1917 to 
November 1917,
1
 whereas the Australian War Memorial electronic archive only contains the 
intelligence summaries for this formation up to May 1917.
2
 However, within the paperwork 
of the General Staff of I Anzac Corps there are new daily and fortnightly intelligence reports 
from Second Army
3
 that are not included within their own files.
4
 These contain further 
analyses shared with I Anzac Corps thus enlightening our perspective on what I Anzac Corps 
knew and when. As such, although important files are missing, there survive indications of 
the information I Anzac Corps was receiving in these remaining days before the battle. It 
should also be noted that the reports from X Corps during the period 1 to 3 October 1917 are 
partial. Most intelligence summaries during this period were written in two parts. Part 1 
contained a general overview of the intelligence that day. Part 2 would expand on certain 
aspects such as full reports of interrogations, information from other units, and details of 
captured documentation. Unfortunately X Corps‟ reports during these three days are missing 
the second parts. As the first parts still remain, however, it is still possible to obtain an 
accurate reflection of this unit‟s intelligence of the enemy during this period. 
 
Right at the front line, the New Zealand Division reported that the German Army was 
continuing to improvise its defensive positions. At 10 a.m. a „party appeared to be at 
work...about BOEYLKER...apparently digging a trench‟.5 Further down the line „a party of 
the enemy almost 30 strong were working on shell holes at D.8.d.5.6. At least five of this 
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party were hit by our snipers‟. Here, observation of the enemy, indicated as being carried out 
by snipers, confirmed that the enemy was adapting shell holes into fortifications.
6
 This 
adaptation extended into the ruined buildings on the battlefield. As mentioned earlier, one of 
the features of the front along the New Zealand Division‟s line was Dear House. There had 
already been some indications of its occupancy from the enemy from „noises heard‟.7 Further 
observations indicated its use as an infantry strong point as „at 8 30 a.m. 20 of the enemy 
moved past Dear House‟. That it was already occupied and up to twenty enemy soldiers could 
move past it in safety confirmed the earlier intelligence. Although no evidence yet pointed to 
an attack it was clear that the German Army had re-organised. Posts were being established 
and maintained whilst in one area „at 11:10 pm a party of at least 100 men were noticed to be 
working about D.8.central‟. Enemy activity had increased. 
 
X Corps‟ intelligence report for that day validated Robertson‟s analysis that counter attacks 
were to be expected. They also confirmed the New Zealand Division‟s reports that enemy 
activity had increased: 
 
Hostile artillery was active all last night and today, our forward areas and battery positions 
being heavily shelled. 
 
Repeated counter-attacks have been made by the enemy during the day and as a result he 
appears to have occupied JOUST FARM. Our line on one company front has been pushed 
back from CAMERON COVERT and we now hold a line in front of CAMERON 
HOUSE... 
 
Our barrage, harassing fire and bombardment are proceeding and four successful counter 
battery shoots have been carried out so far. Others are in progress.
8
 
 
X Corps were being kept very busy by the operations of the day. This may help to explain 
why their intelligence report for this day was only partial. They did, however, confirm from 
prisoners that the 6
th
 Reserve Division had been in the line at Verdun until the end of August 
1917 and then rested. Their appearance opposite X Corps was reported on the 23 September 
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1917 by a prisoner from the 92
nd
 R.I.R..
9
 This was an indication that this division had just 
over one month‟s rest between fronts. However Second Army did not mention this formation 
when listing the enemy divisions opposite them on 1 October, in a fortnightly summary.
10
 
Therefore, it can be deducted that the 6
th
 Reserve Division was taken out of the line at some 
point between the 23 September and 1 October 1917. This meant that the German Army had 
pulled a unit from one active front, transferred it to a front where they were more heavily 
engaged in, and had to pull it out again within one month. This was another sign that the 
Battle of Third Ypres was draining the German Army‟s resources. 
 
I Anzac Corps also had some interesting information on this day, thanks to Second Army. In 
a document issued to their General Staff, Robertson assessed the probability of a German 
counter-attack.
11
 Correctly, and as stated in this study‟s analysis of the previous day, Second 
Army reported that: 
 
The enemy‟s appreciation of the present situation doubtless turns largely on his experiences 
and the result of his tactics during the September fighting; two main considerations are 
probably prominent in it:- 
 
1. His tactics for counter-attack have failed. 
2. He confidently expects our offensive will continue at (a) Menin Road, and (b) 
Broodseinde Ridge. 
 
The former needs no comment except that he doubtless now sees the necessity for a change 
in his defensive tactics. 
 
The latter will enable him to make plans for counter measures well in advance of our 
resumption of the advance.
12
 
 
This analysis had been drawn from the observations of where the defensive build up was 
occurring over the last few days. Mitchell seems to have directly copied certain aspects of 
this report from the previous fortnightly summary, parts of which have already been used in 
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this study. However, it is expanded here and within the context of this report and the date of 
its issue, carries greater significance.  On 1 October 1917 Mitchell wrote: 
 
That the enemy is changing his tactics is now evident. He has already engaged in a counter 
offensive independent of our last advance after we have become established on our new 
line. This has taken the form of deliberate well organized attacks on our new line about 
Menin Road Ridge...and Polygon Wood. These have followed our last advance after an 
interval of three days in which he has perfected his preparations after the confusion of his 
former failures. He will doubtless make another similar attempt in the same place or 
somewhere on the battle line within the next two days.
13
 
 
This analysis clearly predicted the German counter attack at Broodseinde. The information 
collected over the last few days enabled even further prediction of the German Army‟s 
intentions: 
 
The likelihood is therefore that he will wait until our advance with limited objectives...has 
become established and consolidated and that he will...launch a large well organized attack 
or series of attacks at a time long enough after zero to ascertain our new positions. 
 
To do this would require at least 10-12 hours...It is more likely that he would defer the 
attack until daybreak employing the night in getting up and assembling his assault troops 
and putting on the heavy preparatory bombardment of our line...
14
 
 
This analysis accurately reflected the positions and deployments of the 4
th
 Bavarian, 4
th
 
Guards and the 19
th
 Reserve Divisions in the early hours of 4 October. This was a clear 
success of the BEF‟s intelligence system, in that it predicted the size and time of a major 
counter attack by the enemy forces with a high degree of accuracy. This had been measured 
by an excellent frontline intelligence system, coupled with expert knowledge, experience and 
careful analysis. The original date for the German counter attack had been 3 October, so not 
only did Second Army‟s intelligence staff correctly assess the enemy‟s intentions but its 
timetable also. However, this intelligence failed to signpost one important factor; due to the 
failed attacks on this day, German Command postponed Operation Hohensturm twenty four 
hours to the 4 October.
 15
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2 October 1917 
 
Across Second Army‟s front the German Army was relatively quiet on this day. This was 
expected after the counter-attacks of the last two days. However further observations were 
recorded about the continuing organisation of their forces and their order-of-battle. 
 
The New Zealand Division observed „a considerable amount of work is being carried out in 
trench about D.8.central in front of BOETLEER‟.1 They had already noted that this trench 
„had been deepened during night of 30/1 and now seems nearly complete‟.2 Although this 
trench was part of the network of fortified shell holes, it was further proof of the pace of 
German re-organisation. More defensive modifications had already been made opposite the 
New Zealand Division‟s line. The two houses, Dear and Deuce that had been observed on the 
28/29 September, were still under scrutiny. „Two enemy posts are visible near DEAR 
HOUSE‟ whilst „three men were observed to enter the ruins of DEUCE HOUSE D.14.b. Two 
of them were carrying a long dark object perhaps an M.G.‟.3 By this information it was clear 
that both houses would present problems for the division‟s advance, as the activity indicated 
that they were being held as fortified positions with the German defensive belt. 
 
The New Zealand Division also made some identifications of the enemy division opposite 
their line. Prisoners captured that morning near Dochy Farm were confirmed to be from the 
77
th
 Infantry Regiment, 20
th
 Division.
4
 The divisional intelligence staff learned from the 
interrogation of these men that the 20
th
 Division had been established in this area for at least 
two weeks as the „77th Infantry Regiment came into the line on 28th September after arrival 
from Russia‟.5 However not all of the information provided could be confirmed or was 
useful: 
 
Prisoners saw men of the 79
th
 I.R. and probably 92
nd
 I.R. (also belonging to the 20
th
 
Division) in ROULERS and they think 79
th
 is in the line to south of 77
th
. Order-of-battle to 
the north is not known nor do they know what unit their battalion relieved or the extent of 
                                                          
1
 TNA: PRO WO/157/621, New Zealand Division Intelligence Summary, 2 October 1917. 
2
 Ibid. 
3
 Ibid. 
4
 Ibid. 
5
 Ibid. 
62 
 
their front. Only one battalion (3
rd
) is said to be in line and the other two (1
st
 and 2
nd
) of 
their regiment said to be in billets east of MOORSLEDE.
6
 
 
Only one piece of information could be yielded from this interrogation, though it was 
valuable. The fact that only one regimental battalion was in the line and the other two were in 
their billets pointed to a change of defensive tactics. On the 29 September, II Anzac Corps 
had reported that German battalions were holding their combat zones in depth to prevent a 
major advance. Now, however, these other battalions were being rested and only the front 
was being held in force. 
 
II Anzac Corps, the formation to which the New Zealand Division was attached to, were very 
cautious about this information. Their report after further interrogation of these men stated 
that „the order-of-battle of the 20th Division is subject to confirmation, also the location of the 
supporting battalions‟.7 By looking for further confirmation, II Anzac Corps acknowledged 
the unreliability of this source. They did not report the details from the New Zealand 
Division‟s report at all, thus ensuring speculation was kept to a minimum. This was good 
analytical practice by both division and corps. The divisional report had made clear the 
problems with the source and the gaps in information, yet had pointed to a possible shift in 
defensive strategy, whilst the Corps had taken this on board but had not passed the 
information higher as it was unconfirmed. This system of confirming intelligence through 
multiple sources was good practice and the sign of a mature intelligence system. 
 
The whereabouts of the 4
th
 Bavarian Division was unclear. They had previously been 
assumed to have relieved the 23
rd
 Reserve Division and stayed in the line, as II Anzac Corps 
had previously reported. The Corps‟ summary showed that information from the prisoners 
had pinpointed their use as a counter-attack division only, not as a full relief.
8
 This meant that 
„the corps is therefore now opposed by the 20th Division and the 45th Reserve division 
holding the line from the YPRES-ROULERS Railway southwards‟.9 Therefore, one counter-
attack division was unaccounted for: 
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In addition, the presence of one counter-attack division must be taken into consideration. 
The identity of this division is unknown but according to a captured map it is supposed to 
concentrate on alarm in an area about 1 mile NE of PASSCHENDAELE and counter-attack 
in an SE direction if required.
10
 
 
X Corps also reconfirmed the enemy formations opposite their line were the 19
th
 and 45
th
 
Reserve Divisions.
11
 They had also been consolidating their front line defences.
12
  
 
Because of the attacks of the previous two days Second Army had so much information to 
process they produced two intelligence reports on this day; one for the day and the other for 
the evening. The first covered the backlog of intelligence reported from the lower formations 
from 1 October. It reported the loss of the front line between Cameron Covert and Joist 
Farm.
13
 The German Army had counter-attacked three times across Second Army‟s line and 
still held these positions come the evening of 2 October as the evening report stated „situation 
unchanged‟.14 In the morning summary, there was still evidence of defensive gaps. North of 
the Zandvoorde railway „the enemy appears to be in considerably less strength‟.15 However, 
these gaps were still defended, as one pillbox in this area „still intact, appears to form a centre 
of resistance, having a trench on each side of it ... and apparently dug in fairly deeply‟.16 The 
intelligence picture pointed to a reorganised and refocused enemy.  
 
The lull in artillery activity on this day prompted observations by both II Anzac Corps and 
Second Army. Earlier in the day Second Army had observed the consolidation of the 
Tenbrielen artillery group.
17
 The batteries north of this group had been pulled back 100 yards 
and other guns brought in to strengthen its flanks.
18
 It was clearly an important battery as „the 
enemy is using smoke screens to protect [them] from observation‟.19 Further consolidation 
was in evidence as, for one particular battery, „south of ZONNEBEKE there has been a 
distinct decrease in shelling by light calibres and H.V. [High Velocity] guns were more 
                                                          
10
 Ibid. 
11
 TNA: PRO WO/157/450, X Corps Intelligence Summary, 2 October 1917. 
12
 Ibid; „Signs of a new trench being started by the enemy about 200 yards in front of our line‟ and „a 
photograph of 30
th
 September shows a few short shallow trenches near this point‟. 
13
 TNA: PRO WO/157/119, Second Army Intelligence Summary, 2 October 1917. 
14
 TNA: PRO WO/157/119, Second Army Evening Intelligence Summary, 2 October 1917. 
15
 TNA: PRO WO/157/119, Second Army Intelligence Summary, 2 October 1917. 
16
 Ibid. 
17
 TNA: PRO WO/157/119, Second Army Intelligence Summary, 2 October 1917. 
18
 Ibid. 
19
 Ibid. 
64 
 
extensively used‟.20 Second Army had maps from 1 October showing the new „rearward 
tendency of enemy batteries‟.21 Although Second Army could not state why these guns were 
not firing, the report from II Anzac Corps sheds some light on what may have occurred to 
these guns.   
 
The prisoners from the 77
th
 Division had, so far, not been able to reveal much useful 
intelligence to II Anzac Corp. Their intelligence was unconfirmed. With regards to their 
artillery, however, the prisoners did reveal useful information. II Anzac Corps had observed 
that „hostile artillery aircraft have been unusually active throughout the day operating on our 
front.‟22 Second Army confirmed this across their wider front; „the enemy has carried out less 
shoots on batteries today and has endeavoured to do more observed counter-battery work‟.23 
This counter battery work meant an increased use of aircraft to spot British gun positions. II 
Anzac Corps continued saying „this may possibly be explained by the fact that prisoners 
captured today say that they understood that their Divisional Artillery had been brought up 
with them‟.24 This intelligence might have informed why there was a lack of light artillery 
shelling at certain parts of Second Army‟s front. It was at least further confirmation that the 
German Army was undertaking a major relocation of its artillery to further its defensive 
capabilities. In addition to this II Anzac Corps noticed that these shoots were not random as 
they had been directly after Polygon Wood:  
 
Further particulars of enemy barrage on the morning of the 1
st
 reveal the following:- 
 
1. Particular attention was paid to the dugouts from D.13.d5.0 to D.13 central. 
2. He also gave attention to the dugouts about 300 yards south of DOWNING trench in    
D.14.c. 
3. There was also apparently a barrage line along the road from KANSAS CROSS 
(D.14a.3.1) to D.14.d.0.5. 
4. Our new front line was not shelled.25 
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These shoots were specifically targeted towards clear points on their line. This was another 
sign of their reorganisation and intent to press a counter-attack. The German artillery had, 
however, missed II Anzac Corps‟ new front line. The reasons for this were unclear. 
 
Second Army had correctly anticipated when the German Army was most likely to counter-
attack at Broodseinde, giving the possible dates as 3-4 October. It had also predicted changes 
in defensive tactics. The intelligence received on this day, whilst not yet confirming these 
theories, did point towards their accuracy. The changes in artillery disposition, targeted 
shoots and aircraft activity suggested a rapid reorganisation. Second Army had stated that the 
German Army‟s defensive tactics had failed and 2 October began to show that German High 
Command recognised this fact. The regiments behind the line were now being rested and 
more emphasis was being on put on frontline defences. The front line was now being held 
more strongly as was evidenced by observation of its upkeep. Similarly the changes in the 
order-of battle at the regimental level showed that only one regiment seemed to be holding 
the front line, and would likely be relieved by one of the two rested regiments, as opposed to 
all three being in lines in depth. However, it was clear that the Broodseinde ridge was still the 
priority for the enemy as other defensive lines such as the Zonnebeke-Staden line were being 
neglected. One major intelligence problem though remained the presence of an unknown 
counter-attack division.   
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3 October 1917 
 
Second Army saw a marked increase in enemy activity this day.
1
 However this was not 
across the entire front. II Anzac Corps affirmed they had suffered from increased artillery fire 
but decreased aircraft activity.
2
 Meanwhile X Corps‟ front was much quieter.3 Further 
intelligence informed all three of these formations which further informed the state of the 
German Army, now only one day before the British assault.  
 
The intelligence from the prisoners from the 77
th
 Infantry Regiment fell into further 
disrepute. A further prisoner from this unit was caught by II Anzac Corps: 
 
He confirms the Order-of-battle given in yesterday‟s summary but states that two battalions 
are in the front line system, each with three companies in front line and one in support line 
of shell craters. Each company in front line has two platoons in front and one in support.
4
 
 
The German front line was being held more strongly than had been thought. The previous 
day‟s intelligence had stipulated that the front line was being held by one battalion only. II 
Anzac Corps had been wise to state that this needed confirmation, as now they were 
presented with conflicting reports. Further doubt was cast on the previous intelligence when 
the new prisoner reported that „Company trench strength is said to be about 90. (This does 
not agree with the statement of the prisoner taken yesterday morning)‟.5 II Anzac Corps now 
had conflicting reports on the strength of the enemy‟s front line. This meant a confusing 
situation had arisen as this new information was yet to be confirmed, however as an 
indication of German defensive tactics, it correlated with the information given to them by 
Second Army the day before. Captured documents also gave a strong indication of the areas 
targeted by the German Army. They noted the Langemarck-Gheluvelt and Hanneback lines 
as possible places to attack.
6
 However this document was dated 25 September, and 
considering the number of counter-attacks already made, this information was out of date. 
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X Corps also reported little intelligence on this day, but did make one acute observations. 
They had received shelling across their entire line and particularly their battery areas.
7
 One 
statement within the intelligence summary, although unsubstantiated, gave a premonition of 
the events of the 4 October; „At 2.45pm the enemy was reported to be massing in JETTY 
WARREN and was probably caught by our barrage as no infantry action followed‟.8 This 
uncorroborated statement combined with II Anzac Corps‟ intelligence did seem point to the 
accuracy of Second Army‟s assertion that the enemy‟s defensive tactics had changed. 
Holding the front line with two battalions was a clear sign of this change, as well as massing 
their infantry in front line trenches.  
 
Once again Second Army produced two reports covering the day‟s intelligence. The first 
report stipulated the mixed ground conditions across no man‟s land, ranging from „passable‟ 
to „very much waterlogged‟.9 In spite of this, further trench works were being undertaken by 
the enemy.
10
 Second Army also confirmed that hostile artillery had been quieter yesterday. 
This had allowed aerial reconnaissance to be undertaken. Robertson stated that „a sketch map 
showing locations by the R.F.C. and Field Survey Company on October 1
st
 and 2
nd
 
...indicates the rearward tendency of enemy batteries between the YPRES-ROULERS 
Railway and the MENIN Road.‟11 This confirmed the reports from both X Corps and II 
Anzac Corps from the previous days that the German guns were being further consolidated 
rearwards. The BEF had a mature intelligence system in place by seeking, and confirming, 
the accuracy of these reports. 
 
Second Army‟s intelligence staff also summarized the German order-of-battle for that day. 
Both the 25
th
 and 19
th
 Reserve Divisions had been confirmed to be in the line from captured 
prisoners.
12
 Mitchell reported that „it appears established that the 20th Division has relieved 
the 4
th
 Bavarian Division in the PASSCHENDAELE sector, on 28
th
/29
th
 September‟.13 He 
continued: 
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In this event the 4
th
 Bavarian Division is a Counter-Attack Division and the enemy has 
followed his now usual policy of withdrawing the division immediately after it has made its 
counter-attack. It will, therefore, probably be used again against this sector.
14
  
 
This was confirmation of the information of X Corps from the previous day. The intelligence 
that the prisoners from the 77
th
 Regiment, 20
th
 Division had given the previous day had 
enabled the tracking of movements of a German counter-attack division. The use of these was 
very interesting from the British perspective. This division had been brought into the line 
only for one day, used to attack, and then sent back again. This was also good analysis as 
elements of the 4
th
 Bavarian Division were used in the counter-attack the next day. It was a 
tactic that seemed to indicate the German Army were struggling with their manpower, as they 
were more quickly rotating divisions and bringing some in just for one day. These tactics 
were being used across Second Army‟s front, creating confusion: 
 
It is not yet clear whether the whole of the 45
th
 Reserve Division has actually taken over the 
sector south of the YPRES-ROULERS Railway. The 236
th
 Division was almost certainly 
withdrawn about the 27
th
 September, and there are indications that elements of the 4
th
 
Guard Division may have relieved it. The 45
th
 Reserve Division may only have been used 
as a Counter-Attack Division in this sector; prisoners state that only the 210
th
 R.I.R. 
actually came up to counter-attack, not the 211
th
 R.I.R. or 212
th
 R.I.R.
15
 
 
The evening report further confirmed this use of counter-attack divisions. More importantly, 
it also pointed to a division being brought into the line opposite X Corps. It stated „Abnormal 
train movement northwards from LILLE observed by ground observers this evening between 
6 and 7 probably troops coming up from south and may possibly indicate arrival of relieving 
or supporting division between ZONNEBEKE and GHELUVELT perhaps in sector of 19
th
 
Reserve Division‟.16 This movement was possibly elements of the 4th Bavarian Division 
being moved towards the front, although they attacked with the 45
th
 Reserve Division not the 
19
th
 Reserve Division. It might also have been the rest of the 45
th
 Reserve Division being 
brought up for the upcoming assault, as Mitchell commented „the 45th Reserve Division, one 
regiment of which has appeared in this sector, is probably being held as the Counter-Attack 
Division‟.17 The troops being moved could not be pinpointed in time for an accurate 
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assessment to be made. All that was known was that a major reinforcement had been made 
for an unknown purpose. 
 
By the end of 3 October, the BEF had monitored a rise in troop, aerial and artillery activity 
throughout the day. Small counter-attacks had been fought off but some, particularly at 
Cameron Covert and Joist Farm, had been successful. The BEF‟s frontline intelligence 
system had made them aware of major changes to the enemy‟s defensive fortifications, tactics 
and even strategy. They had accurately predicted the 3 and 4 October as possible dates for a 
major counter attack and witnessed movements that suggested a divisional relief or 
reinforcement that day. However, the one factor that stopped the accurate prediction of the 
time of the counter-attack was the very thing that had allowed such accurate analysis to occur 
in the days leading up to the battle. These reports could not be confirmed at this late hour. 
The German attack began at 6am. As has been seen, some of this intelligence could only be 
confirmed one or two days after it had first been reported. This was not a fault of the BEF or 
even Military Intelligence during this period. The use of counter-attack divisions in this way 
was unpredictable, but good intelligence had at least given enough useful information for 
Second Army to fully appreciate the tactics that the German Army was using the night before 
its attack. Ultimately, it is doubtful that confirmation of this intelligence would have changed 
Second Army‟s attack plans, as the British troops were already getting into the positions 
ready for the advance.   
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Conclusion 
 
The massacre of the German Divisions at Broodseinde was not a premeditated event. The 
original date of Broodseinde had been brought forward to 4 October from 6 October thanks to 
the speed with which II Anzac Corps could relieve V Corps. This decision was made by the 
26 September, immediately after Polygon Wood. By this time it is clear not enough 
information had been collected that pointed to a large scale enemy assault.
1
 Only by 1 
October had Second Army predicted that a major attack was due, advising the date was either 
3 or 4 October.  
 
The intelligence summaries after the battle make it clear that the German attack would have 
achieved some surprise, if it had not coincided with the British attack; „It appears from 
prisoners statements that three hostile divisions had assembled in his locality for an attack to 
be delivered at 6.0 this morning, but were completely broken up by our attacking Australian 
infantry and artillery fire‟.2 On the 4 October, only observations and unsubstantiated reports 
could be made, but by the evening and the next day the picture had become clear. Mitchell 
wrote, in his evening analysis, that „elements of three enemy divisions were found reinforcing 
his normal garrison in the ZONNEBEKE sector‟.3 Two of these divisions, the 19th Reserve 
and 4
th
 Bavarian Divisions were known to be in the line or in support during the intelligence 
build-up. The last minute reinforcement recorded on the 3 October was later learned to be the 
4
th
 Guards Division.
4
 They had been diverted from Lille, and had been originally headed 
further north.
5
  
 
The ability of the BEF‟s intelligence system to keep such a close track on the German Army 
on a day to day basis was thanks to its field intelligence. The front line collation activities 
carried out by the officers of the Intelligence Corps established an excellent system of 
intelligence analysis. These six days before the Battle of Broodseinde show a mature 
analytical system that checked sources and confirmed information. In these six days, the BEF 
relied mainly on prisoner interrogations, battlefield detritus and ground observation to report 
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on the state of the German Army. Other technologies such as flash-spotting and sound-
ranging were used in conjunction with aerial observation. The consolidation of the German 
artillery groups was reported on the 29 September by I Anzac Corps thanks to flash spotting. 
These reports were not taken as definitive, however, until the RFC made visual confirmation. 
Only by the 1 and 2 October were they able to do so, as the Germans had kept them shrouded 
by smoke screens. It is likely that this confirmation was not sought due to any unreliability of 
the observation technologies but from knowledge that technological advancements could not 
always compensate for simple human observation. From the reports of this week, it is clear 
that aerial observation played a large and important role in confirming artillery related 
intelligence. 
 
British military intelligence did predict the major-German counter attack on 4 October but 
could not confirm it. It had accurately monitored the state and intentions of the German Army 
on the front during the build up to the battle. It gave British high command a clear picture of 
German defensive doctrine and tactics. However, as stated in the introduction this thesis does 
not intend to fully measure the accuracy of intelligence, although no conclusions can be made 
without reference to this factor. The aim of this thesis was to ascertain how successful British 
military intelligence was at assessing the intentions of the German Army. Judged in this 
regard the BEF performed well. Second Army was able to predict the attack at Broodseinde 
thanks to an intelligence system that could provide multiple reinforcing sources. The 
accuracy of analysis achieved during these six days was due to Second Army‟s disciplined 
intelligence staff. By acknowledging gaps in its information and awaiting confirmation of 
new intelligence, they showed that important elements of the BEF practiced a good analytical 
methodology. The failure to confirm the date of the attack should not be viewed as a failure 
of Second Army or the BEF‟s intelligence system. It is almost perverse to conclude that 
Second Army could not accurately predict Operation Hohensturm because of the mature and 
established intelligence system. When the reports reached them on 3 October of vast train 
movements, they did not jump to conclusions but awaited more information. The quality of 
further analysis at Corps and Division level, and the evolution of the Intelligence Corps 
continued this good methodology, yet it must be tempered that at this time, GHQ and Fifth 
Army did not practice this discipline so well. Overall intelligence analysis within the BEF 
before Broodseinde was mixed. More formations showed better practices than others. 
However, the intelligence analysis that was undertaken by the British and Anzac formations 
before Broodseinde, was excellent. An intelligence officer once commented that „perfect 
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intelligence in a war must of necessity be out-of-date and therefore cease to be perfect.‟6 This 
rang true for Second Army‟s intelligence staff in the build up to Broodseinde. 
 
In the wider context of the First World War it is clear that Broodseinde represented a time 
when the BEF was advancing. As Beach makes clear lulls in forward movement could inhibit 
the amount of intelligence taken, especially from prisoners and thus analysis could be 
compromised.
7
 Any further study of the BEF‟s field intelligence has to take this factor into 
account. 1917 had seen a great evolution of the BEF‟s military intelligence system up to this 
point. It is outside the remit of this study but the system would further evolve into 1918, 
culminating in the accurate prediction of the German advance in the spring of that year.
8
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